Watch Movie CHILDREN OF Online Megashare… Children of english audio. Many people first became aware of the Shatila refugee camp in Lebanon after the shocking and horrific Sabra-Shatila massacre that took place there in 1982. Located in Beirut's "belt of misery. the camp is home to 15, 000 Palestinians and Lebanese who share a common experience of displacement, unemployment and poverty. Fifty years after the exile of their grandparents from Palestine, the children of Shatila attempt to come to terms with the reality of being refugees in a camp that has survived massacre, siege and starvation. Director Mai Masri focuses on two Palestinian children in the camp: Farah, age 11 and Issa, age 12. When these children are given video cameras, the story of the camp evolves from their personal narratives as they articulate the feelings and hopes of their generation. This film is available with a Digital Site License (DSL) which allows colleges, universities, or libraries to encode, locally host, and stream the film to their community on a closed, password-protected system. Rental Information This film is available from AFD for public screenings and television broadcast. For information regarding rental rates and formats, please contact for institutional/non-theatrical screenings, or for theatrical, festival, television, or other bookings.
Credit. The New York Times Archives See the article in its original context from September 26, 1982, Section 1, Page 19 Buy Reprints TimesMachine is an exclusive benefit for home delivery and digital subscribers. About the Archive This is a digitized version of an article from The Timess print archive, before the start of online publication in 1996. To preserve these articles as they originally appeared, The Times does not alter, edit or update them. Occasionally the digitization process introduces transcription errors or other problems; we are continuing to work to improve these archived versions. The massacre of more than 300 Palestinian and Lebanese men, women and children at the Shatila refugee camp by Christian militiamen has left many unanswered questions. The slayings, which began Wednesday, Sept. 15, and continued until Saturday, Sept. 18, raise questions that focus particularly on the role played by the Israeli Army in what is certain to be regarded as one of the most important events in the modern history of the Middle East. Much is at stake in the answers to these questions. The relations between the Israeli people and their Government, the relations between world Jewry and Israel, the relations between Washington and Jerusalem and the relations between Israelis and Palestinians will all be affected by the truth of what happened in Shatila. The Aftermath of the Slayings The full truth may never be known. Too many people have already fled the scene. Too many people were killed on the spot. Too many people are now under pressure to hide their deeds. There has been no announcement of any investigation in Lebanon of the militiamen who actually did the killing. In Israel, Prime Minister Menachem Begin rejected the idea of an independent judicial commission of inquiry into the Israeli involvement in the massacre. On Friday, he proposed an investigation of lesser scope, but it was unclear whether the Chief Justice of Israel's Supreme Court will accept the invitation to head it. What follows is a reconstruction of events as could be pieced together at this time from witnesses and statements by participants. It is not the final word. Information is still coming to light. But on the basis of the evidence so far, some conclusions may be drawn. Role of the Israeli Army First, the Christian militiamen entered the camp with the full knowledge of the Israeli Army, which provided them with at least some of their arms and provisions and assisted them with flares during nighttime operations. Second, the Israelis had to have known that there was deep and pervasive fear of the Christian militiamen among the Palestinian residents of the camps, because of past atrocities committed by the Christians and Palestinians on each other during the Lebanese civil war. Third, the Israeli Army began to learn on the evening of Thursday, Sept. 16, that civilians were being killed in Shatila, since from the moment these armed men entered the camps they began murdering people at random and those who fled flee told the Israelis what was happening. The Extent of the Evidence By Friday morning, there was enough evidence of untoward acts by the militiamen that the senior Israeli commander in Lebanon ordered their operations halted, according to the Israeli Government. Yet, according to Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, the militiamen doing the killing were told by the Israelis they could stay inside the camps until Saturday morning, and the murders continued until they left. Fourth, there is every indication that when the Israeli Army entered West Beirut earlier that week that it encountered no serious resistance, if any, from the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The vast majority of people in the camps appear to have been resigned to the Israelis coming into their area and disarming them. Evidence of Haddad's Role Finally, there is still no solid information on the precise makeup and command structure of the Christian militia force, which also apparently included some Shiite Moslems. But there is ample circumstantial evidence that members of the Israeli-armed and trained militia of Maj. Saad Haddad and members of the Christian Phalangist militia - also known as the Lebanese Forces -were in the camps. Whether or not they were there under orders from Major Haddad or the Phalangist militiary and political leadership is not clear. The possibility of breakaway elements being involved cannot be ruled out at this point. Once Yasir Arafat, the P. L. O. chairman, decided in early July that he would be leaving Lebanon, his major concern was to make certain that the Lebanese Government and the special United States envoy, Philip C. Habib, provided proper security guarantees for the thousands of Palestinian civilians who would be left behind without P. protection. During the talks on ending the Israeli siege of Beirut, P. officials and the Sunni Moslem leaders of West Beirut - notably Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazzan and former Prime Minister Saeb Salam - repeatedly expressed the view that Israeli tanks could not be permitted to enter West Beirut with Phalangist militiamen in their train. The reason was fear. This fear, which the negotiators repeatedly expressed in public and which was surely known to the Israelis, was rooted in a series of mass killings and attacks - perpetrated by Lebanese Christian militiamen against Palestinians and Moslems, and by Moslems and Palestinians against Christians - that dated from the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976. A Preventative Measure It was to prevent such bloody incidents, according to Mr. Salam, a key figure in the talks, that the Moslem and Palestinian representatives insisted that United States, Italian and French troops be deployed in West Beirut until the Lebanese Army was prepared to take over the enforcement of law and order. Mr. Salam said that this was ' precisely why we asked, and received, assurances from the United States that the Israelis would not enter West Beirut. State Department officials have made clear their support for Mr. Salam's view that these assurances were an integral part of the Habib agreement. American officials believe Israel violated the agreement when it moved into West Beirut on Sept. 15 after the assassination of Lebanon's President-elect, the Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel. Lebanon's Army Moves In On Sept. 2, with the P. gone and French, United States and Italian peacekeeping troops in place, the Lebanese Army began to deploy its forces all over West Beirut and in the southern suburbs, where the Palestinian Fakhani district and refugee camps are situated. For the most part, the Lebanese Army's deployment in West Beirut and the adjacent suburbs went smoothly. Although the army was then in the process of establishing control over West Beirut, the Israeli Army maintained a toehold in the Moslem sector of the capital, near the traffic circle at the Kuwaiti Embassy. Israeli forces also held positions to the south, toward Beirut's international airport, which they controlled. The airport is very close to the Shatila, Sabra and Burj al Brajneh camps. There are about 500, 000 Palestinians in Lebanon, and many of them have lived in refugee camps such as Shatila since 1948. While the term ' camps' may evoke images of tents and other temporary shelters, these settlements actually consisted of more permanent structures: concrete houses, streets and twisting alleyways. A Brief Period of Calm On Sept. 11, both the Shatila and Sabra camps were quiet and, according to residents, there was no apprehension over the prospect of the Lebanese Army moving in. It seemed almost as though life in West Beirut was about to return to what passes for normal here. The Sunni Moslem leaders were making their peace with President-elect Gemayel, and businessmen with reconstruction projects in mind were beginning to survey the devastated city center. On Tuesday, Sept. 14, the situation began to unravel very quickly. That morning, Mr. Gemayel convened a meeting in the East Beirut of commanders of the Phalangist militia - whose formal name was the Lebanese Forces. It was the same militia Mr. Gemayel commanded before Lebanon's Parliament elected him to the presidency. Since the civil war, Mr. Gemayel's Phalangist Party has been the dominant element in a coalition of Maronite Christian parties that has controlled East Beirut and a Christian enclave to the north. An Assassination by Bombing In the middle of the meeting called by Mr. Gemayel, a huge bomb, apparently placed on the roof of the building by someone familiar with Mr. Gemayel's schedule, exploded. It brought the entire structure down on the President-elect and his aides. Gemayel perished. According to a statement by Ariel Sharon to the Israeli Parliament, moments after the President-elect's death became known, the Israeli Defense Minister contacted Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the two men decided that the Israeli Army should enter West Beirut. Sharon Sees a Threat Mr. Sharon argued that the Israeli presence was required, because as long as P. guerrillas and Lebanese leftist Moslem militiamen remained armed and in the refugee camps, control over West Beirut by the Lebanese Government would be tenuous, and there would be a potential for the P. to reestablish itself. Although the Israelis confiscated the arms of all of the Moslem groups in West Beirut, they made no attempt to disarm the Christian Phalangist militiamen in East Beirut. Under the terms of the Habib agreement, those militiamen constituted an illegal force. The stage had been set for the massacres. WEDNESDAY At 3:30 A. M. Wednesday, a meeting was held in Beirut between the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieut. Gen. Rafael Eytan; the commander of Israeli units in the north, Maj. Amir Drori, and the general staff of the Phalangist militia. At this meeting, a Phalangist ' entry into the camps was mentioned. according to Mr. Sharon's later account to the Israeli Parliament. Throughout the early hours of Wednesday, Israeli troops poured into West Beirut from Hercules transport planes that were landing at the international airport. At the same time, tanks and armored personnel carriers were arriving from surrounding areas. Israelis Seize Intersections The Israelis began to enter the city proper around 5 A. M., according to Mr. Sharon's subsequent statement to the Israeli Parliament. His troops quickly began seizing key intersections. At some locations, fierce gun battles erupted between Israeli soldiers and Moslem militiamen. The Israelis skirted the Palestinian refugee camps, making no attempt to enter them. There appear to have been exchanges of fire between the Israelis and some individuals in the camps, but these were minor. Witnesses say there was no organized resistance from the Sabra or Shatila camps to the Israeli invasion of West Beirut. 'We Were Not Afraid. We were not afraid of the Israelis. Zaki F., a 30-year-old Palestinian in the Sabra camp, said in an interview last week. We know most of them are not bad people. Most of us just locked ourselves in our homes and waited for them to come. We figured we would wait to turn over our arms and that would be it. And so, camp residents said, they buttoned themselves into their homes on Wednesday and waited for the Israelis to arrive. They did so probably for the same reason that Palestinian guerrillas preferred to flee across the Jordan River into Israel during the Jordanian civil war in 1970 rather than allow themselves to be captured by the Jordanian Army: a basic belief that the Israelis were not ' monsters. However, according to Mr. Sharon's testimony in Parliament, as well as interviews with Israeli soldiers, the Israelis had no intention of going into the camps. What Mr. Sharon described to Parliament as a process of ' checking and clearing out' the refugee camps was, he said, a job that was to be performed by the Phalangists or the Lebanese Army. By Wednesday afternoon, sniper fire and Israeli shelling had begun around the Sabra and Shatila camps, and it was intensifying. Dr. Per Maehlumshagen, a Norwegian orthopedic surgeon at Gaza Hospital, not far from the Shatila camp, recalled that ' there was a lot of sniping and some shelling' around the hospital. Around noon on Wednesday. Dr. Maehlumshagen recalled. the first wounded started to be brought in. That was the first time we began to hear - I don't remember how - that the Israelis were surrounding the camp and setting up checkpoints. Zaki F., a Palestinian whose concrete-block home is only a few hundred yards from the hospital, said that by Wednesday afternoon. no one was moving in or out of the camps. The Israelis Make a Request At roughly the same time - the precise hour is uncertain - Mr. Sharon said that the Israeli command in West Beirut contacted the Lebanese Army operations chief for the sector to ask whether the Lebanese were willing to go into the camps on what were termed search-and-destroy missions. A Lebanese colonel, Michel On, rejected the Israeli proposal. This was corroborated in Mr. Sharon's subsequent statement. Colonel On explained in an interview that his refusal was based on the fact that the Lebanese Army was just then reconstituting itself as an organization. He said it was also then beginning to win the confidence of the Moslem militiamen, Moslem residents and Palestinians of West Beirut. According to the colonel, the army wanted to follow its own agenda and its own style in seeking to bring order to the camps. According to a plan set out by Prime Minister Wazzan, the army had already taken over control of the Burj al Brajneh camp to the south. But on Wednesday, it was not yet ready to move into the Sabra and Shatila camps. Meanwhile, in the camps themselves, Dr. Eivinu Witsoe, a Norwegian surgeon working at Gaza Hospital, said things were beginning to quiet down. By nightfall, he said, the shooting and shelling had subsided; and about 25 wounded people had been brought into the hospital. On Wednesday evening, according to Defense Minister Sharon, General Drori met with Colonel On and pressed the Lebanese officer ' to persuade the political echelons in the Lebanese Government to approve the entry of the army of Lebanon into the camps. The colonel consulted Prime Minister Wazzan about the Israeli request. Wazzan turned it down. The Israelis had surrounded the camp. the Prime Minister recalled in an interview. If the army had agreed to go in and remove arms and Israelis killed Palestinians, everyone would have blamed the Lebanese Army and Government. The Government and army, he added, did not want to be used ' as an instrument of Israeli policy. Throughout Wednesday night, according to people in both Sabra and Shatila, it was quiet. No one felt any overwhelming sense of fear. THURSDAY By Thursday morning, the Israeli Army had the entire area around the Sabra and Shatila camps sealed off. No one could move in or out. A spokesman in East Beirut for the Israeli Army, formally known as the Israel Defense Forces, issued the following statement that day. The I. D. F. is in control of all key points in Beirut. Refugee camps harboring terrorist concentrations remain encircled and closed. The I. calls on citizens to return to normal activity and on all terrorists and other armed persons to lay down their arms. Around 6 A. Thursday, shellfire and gunshots could be heard in the Sabra camp in the vicinity of Gaza Hospital, according to Dr. Witsoe. Although the night had been calm, new groups of wounded people were streaming into the medical center. Israeli Shelling Reported The artillery fire, many of these patients later said, appeared to be coming from Israeli positions overlooking the camp to the west. Armed elements inside Sabra may also have been firing at targets outside the camp. According to Mr. Sharon, after another meeting was held Thursday between the Phalangist liaison officers and General Drori. it was concluded that the armed force of Christian militiamen would enter Shatila from the south and west, would look out for and clear out the terrorists. And. Mr. Sharon added. it was stressed that civilians - especially women, children and old people -should not be harmed. The full story of what happened after the meeting between General Drori and the Phalangist officers is still not known. Phalangist officials said that by 3 o'clock Thursday afternoon, they had a large force of men at the airport. However, they contend that these men never left the airport area. Militiamen Begin to Move Most interviews with survivors of the massacre indicate that at least some of the 1, 500 Phalangists at the airport - but by no means all -moved north toward the Sabra and Shatila camps along a road leading through Ouzai, up past the Henri Chehab army barracks and into the Kuwaiti Embassy traffic circle, just down the main road from the entrance of the Sabra camp. There the militiamen established makeshift headquarters in a building that housed the Lebanese University's School of Business Administration, on the southwest corner of the traffic circle. There are a whole series of what appear to be traffic signs pointing the way from the airport to the rotary, which overlooks Shatila and Sabra. These signs, spray-painted on walls, have a round circle with a triangle inside and the letters ' M. P. under them. They are the symbol of the Phalangist military police. A Question of Identity But the Phalangists were not the only Christian militiamen moving out of the airport Thursday afternoon. There is also a sizable body of circumstantial evidence suggesting that members of the militia of Maj. Saad Haddad, armed and trained by Israel, were also at the airport and may also have moved up to the staging area, despite Israeli denials that they were involved in any way in the slayings. The evidence includes interviews with Lebanese soldiers who were on duty in the traffic circle, and had been on duty there since Sept. 3. They said they saw Haddad militiamen there, dressed in uniforms readily distinguishable from those of the Phalangist militiamen. They also said the Haddad men were noticeable because they lacked the Phalangist insignia on the left breast pocket reading ' Lebanese Forces. Southern Lebanese Accents Further, scores of survivors from the camps said in interviews that some of the militiamen spoke with southern Lebanese accents and addressed one another by such names as Ali, and Abbas. Both are Shiite Moslem names. Roughly half of Major Haddad's 6, 000-member militia members are Shiites from the south. Finally, Major Haddad said in an interview with The Times of London that some of his men "may have been serving with other forces in Beirut" when the massacre in the camps ocurred. It seems clear that there were militiamen for Major Haddad's group in the strike force that entered the camps on Thursday afternoon. What is not clear is whether the Haddad militiamen could have reached the camps - far from their normal area of operations in the south along the Israeli border - without the knowledge or active cooperation of the Israelis. At the least, the circumstantial evidence indicates that some members of the Haddad militia passed through Israeli lines in an apparent effort to join up with the Phalangists going into the Palestinian camps. According to a Lebanese Army soldier, the militia force going into the camps was composed primarily of Phalangist units consisting of men from Damur, Saadiyat and Nameh. These are three Christian villages that were sacked by palestinian forces during the Lebanese civil war in retaliation for attacks on palestinians by Christian militiamen. The Lebanese soldier said that one Phalangist militiaman told him before going into the camps, We have been waiting a long time for this day. A Key Israeli Decision Something around noon Thursday, General Drori, having received another negative response from the Lebanese Army to his request that it move into the camps, met with the commander of the Phalangists. Judging from all available evidence, it was at this point that the Israelis made a decision to send the militiamen into the camps. Sharon does not say who the Phalangist commander was, but it is believed to have been the Phalangist chief of staff, Fadi Ephram. According to Phalangist military sources, an order was then issued for an estimated 1, 500 men to assemble on the runways at the airport. According to residents in Shuweifat, a junction town just south of the airport, there was a steady stream of trucks and armored personnel carriers moving into the airport during the afternoon. All carried Christian militiamen, the residents say. Their accounts were corroborated by Lebanese Army source. Another Meeting Is Held The militiamen, the witnesses said, appeared to be coming from both southern Lebanon - the area of Major Haddad's stronghold - and East Beirut. According to what Defense Minister Sharon has told the Israeli Parliment, another meeting was held at roughly the same time Thursday afternoon that Phalangist troops were assembling at the airport. The meeting was held between the commander of the Israeli Army division deployed around Beirut, Brig. Amos Yaron, and Phalangist liaison officers. The aim of the meeting, Mr. Sharon said, was to "coordinate the entry of the Phalangists into the Shatila camp. Sometime around 4 P. Thursday, according to residents of the camps, armed men began moving in. Israelis Had View of Camp Mr. Sharon says the attack began at night. The Israeli Army had an observation post, equipped with binoculars and a powerful telescope, atop a five-story apartment building in the northwest quadrant of the Kuwaiti Embassy traffic circle. From that position it is possible to see into at least part of the Shatila camp, including those parts where piles of dead bodies were found later. All available evidence, including testimony by witnesses, suggests that it is probable that Israeli soldiers were manning the post during the time of the massacre. The strongest evidence found by reporters who visited the observation station was in the form of Hebrew-language newspapers found on the floor. They were dated Thursday and Friday. According to a witness living in a two-story house about half a mile into the Shatila camp from the southern entrance, the sounds of heavy fire and shelling began to be heard around 4 P. The din was coming from the southern gate. A 'Softening-Up' Process Judging from the way buildings were destroyed at the southern entrance of the camp, Lebanese Army officials say it appears that the militiamen attempted first to "soften up" the area, using heavy-caliber weapons possibly recoiless rifles. This appears to have been what the witness, who indentified herself as Mrs. Hashem, the wife of Abdul Hadi Ahmed Hashem, was hearing around 4 P. An hour later, Mrs. Hashem recalled, she and her husband grabbed their children and rushed from their house, running northward to escape the gunfire, deeper into the Shatila camp. At one point, Mrs. Hashem recalled, her husband, Abdul Hadi Ahmed, decided to go back to their home to retrieve some food and milk for the children. He never returned. His bulletriddled body was later found in the house. From the moment they entered the camp, witnesses said, the militiamen made no apparent effort to distinguish between Palestinians and Lebanese, let alone between men, women and children. According to Col. Marcel Prince, the Lebanese Army Surgeon General, as well as medical workers, those people whose bodies were found toward the southern entrance of Shatila were killed at random while other appeared to have been lined up against walls and shot. In other cases, what appeared to be entire families had been slain as they sat at the dinner table. Others were found dead in their nightclothes, apparently suprised by the militamen who burst in on them Thursday evening. Some people were found with their throats slit. Others had been mutilated with some kind of heavy blade, perhaps axes. But according to Colonel Prince, most people died from gunshot wounds and "the killings were done very quickly. Some Fled to Adjacent Camp With people running to get out of the path of the militiamen, it was natural that many would seek refugee in the Sabra refugee camp, farther north, toward the Gaza Hospital. Others fled to the south, to the Akka Hospital, across from the Shatila camp. Taleb Alouki, a 26-year-old carpenter, and his brother Fawzi, 22, recalled that they were sitting with a group of men drinking tea in their homes in the middle of Shatila around 6 P. Thursday when they heard a great deal of noise and shooting coming from the southern end of the camp. Two men in the group were dispatched to find out what was going on, they recalled later. They returned with a story that Haddad militiamen were killing people in the Shatila camp. Meanwhile, Zaki F. was in his home near Gaza Hospital on Thursday afternoon when he heard the first reports from people rushing through the neighborhood that members of the Haddad militia were sweeping through Shatila "cutting people with knives. As Zaki remembers it, sometime around 4 P. Thursday he decided to go to the Israeli Army position, just over the hill across from the stadium, and find out what was going on. By now it was well known in the camp that the area was surrounded by Israeli forces. According to Zaki, he spoke to a blond, Arabic-speaking Israeli officer who identified himself only as Rami. They spoke near the Bir Hassan post office, across from the stadium. The Israeli perimeter around the camp ran through this area. "I told him I saw a woman shot in the hand who said Haddad men were k illing people. Zaki recalled. "I admitted we had guns in our homes b ut we did not want to fight and were prepared to give them to the I sraelis. "He told me to go back to the camp and have everyone from age 13 to 50 to bring his weapons here and that I had until 5 P. Michel Gerti, a reporter for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, also quoted Israeli soldiers as saying that people were coming out of the camps as early as Thursday evening with tales of a massacre. Gerti wrote in Haaretz that at one point he had been approached by Israeli soldiers stationed outside Shatila. They told him that on Thursday evening, several Palestinian women ran out of Shatila crying hysterically that their children were being butchered. At this point, early Thursday night, the story is best picked up by the doctors and nurses inside the Gaza and Akka Hospitals, situated on the north and south ends of the Shatila camp. An Increase in Casualties According to Drs. Maehlumshagen and Witsoe, beginning Thursday afternoon, a large number of casualties began flooding into the hospital: mostly men, women and children with gunshot wounds in the head, chest and stomach as well as a variety of shrapnel injuries. From 8 P. Thursday until 5 A. Friday, the physicians said, they were busy treating patients. The doctors said the first indication they had that a massacre might be taking place was when an 11-year-old boy, Milad Farouk, was brought into the hospital with three gunshot wounds. He told the doctors that Christian militiamen had burst into his house in Shatila and shot his mother, father and three siblings, one an infant. Then they shot him. Hundred Flee the Scene At the same time these wounded people were being treated Thursday evening, hundred of people - the doctors estimate that there were anywhere from 1, 000 to 2, 000 of them began flocking to the hospital and the nearby buildings to seek safety. Pandemonium reigned everywhere. In the operating theater, the physicians said, Palestinian nurses were breaking down in tears in the middle of surgery out of fear for their lives. In the streets of Shatila, people were rushing about in terror. The dead and dying were being carried to the hospital by families, as no ambulance drivers would go out. The scene was made all the more frightening, the doctors said, by the illumination flares that were being fired by Israeli troops over the camps and dropped by Israeli aircraft. A Sky Aglow With Flares Mr. Sharon said the 81-milimeter flares were requested by the Phalangists to light their way. Residents in the camp say the sky was aglow most of the night. "I was here throughout the siege" of Beirut, said Tineke Uluf, a 30-year-old Dutch nurse who was working in the Gaza Hospital, and I never remember the sky being lit up that brightly over the camps. "It was like a sports stadium lit up for a football game. she recalled. "It started about 7 P. and continued late into the night. Sometime around 8 P. Thursday men from the Sabra and Shatila camps came to the Gaza Hospital looking for arms to defend themselves. It is believed from accounts pieced together from various sources among residents in the camp that a last stand of sorts was organized by some of the Shatila men at about this time. It took place about a mile down the main street of the camp, near a building with a blue-green wall, and apprently lasted for most of the night. Buildings in that area are heavily pockmarked from bullets and shellfire, and reporters who visited there Saturday morning found many piles of M-16 shellcases fired by the militiamen. On the ground in the area, reporters found boxes that had contained M-16 bullets. The boxes were printed in Hebrew. Elsewhere, there were wrappings from Israeli chocolate wafers on the ground, as well as remants of United States Army C-rations. Witnesses say the detritus may be evidence that some of the militiamen had been provided with both food and ammunition by the Israelis. On the southern end of the Shatila camp, at the Akka Hospital, the scene on Thursday evening was equally grim, according to an Asian doctor who was working in the hospital at the time but declined to be identified. Bodies All Over the Street The doctor said he had spoken to a boy who said he had seen bodies lying all over the main street of Shatila. At one point, the doctor said, about 500 people crowded into the hospital's basement bomb shelter, where they were working themselves up into a frenzy as each one told the other what he or she had seen on the way to the hospital. Hirsch Goodman, hte military correspondent of The Jersalem Post, reported that he had been shown a cable sent at 11 P. Thursday from the head of the Phalangist units in Shatila to the Israeli command in East Beirut. It said, Mr. Goodman wrote, To this time we have killed 300 civilians and terrorists. The cable was immediately distributed in the command and sent to Tel Aviv, he reported. FRIDAY, SEPT. 17 There is a good deal less information on what happened beginning Friday morning in the camps. Most people were either in hiding or had fled. Early Friday, at Akka Hospital, according to the Asian doctor, a young boy came rushing in, saying that his mother had been knifed and his sister taken away by militiamen. At about this time, the people in the hospital shelter were unable to control their fear any longer and almost all of them fled the hospital in a panic, scattering in all directions. What happened to some of them is not known. The Asian doctor said that in addition to himself, the only medical personnel left behind at Akka Hospital were five Palestinian staff members and six foreign nurses. He said there were also some patients in their rooms. None of them could walk. A Hospital Is Invaded At about 10:20 A. M., witnesses said, militiamen came to the hospital. Speaking Arabic in a southern Lebanese dialect, the witnesses said, they ordered everyone to come out with their hands up. Three foreign nurses left the hospital under a white flag, according to the Asian doctor. He said they were accompanied by a Palestinian physician who worked at the hospital, Mohammed Ali Osman. As they were leaving, a shot rang out, and the Palestinian doctor fell to the ground, dead. At 2 P. Friday, a different group of militiamen came, wearing different uniforms, according to the Asian doctor. He said they started to molest one of the Lebanese nurses, whose name was Friyal. They stopped after she started screaming. Shortly after that we went down to the shelter. the doctor said. and found that one of the Palestinian nurses down there had been raped repeatedly and then shot. He identified her as Intisar Ismail, 19 years old. Two Physicians Are Abducted Around the same time Friday, two Palestinian doctors at the hospital, one named Sami Katib, were abducted by the militiamen who entered the hospital. A Palestinian patient was kidnapped with them. At approximately 3:45 P. M., witnesses say, yet another group of militiamen arrived at the Akka Hospital. Their arrival suggested to the Asian doctor that there was very little coordination between these men, especially since they all tended to ask the same question. The militiamen said they wanted to see the nurses. He told the men that the nurses had all fled. At this point, according to the doctor, the militiamen asked to search the hospital. During the course of their work, they found a photograph of Yasir Arafat in the Asian doctor's room. You are a terrorist. one of the militiamen said to him. Doctor Pleads for His Life At that point, the doctor said, he began to beg for his life. He was told to bring the nurses back to the hospital by 7 P. M., or else, the militiamen said, they would blow his head off. Fortunately for the physician, by about 5 P. Friday, an International Red Cross convoy made it to the hospital and evacuated everyone left there. The doctor said that at about 5:30 P. M., as he was leaving the facility for safety, he saw at the southern end of Shatila what he estimated to be 80 to 90 bodies. They had been mixed together with sand and were being pushed by bulldozers. This area can be seen very clearly with the naked eye from the Kuwaiti Embassy traffic circle - the site of the telescope and binocular-equipped Israeli observation post. Whether the Israelis actually looked down and saw what was happening is unknown. Crisis at Gaza Hospital At Gaza Hospital, on the other end of the camp, matters were also beginning to unravel Friday morning. Just after dawn a nurse on the eighth floor was shot and killed by a sniper, according to witnesses. At about noon, a woman who was director of the hospital called a meeting of the staff in light of the stories being told by the hundreds of people who were gathered around the facility, and by the wounded who had been brought inside. Her message was simple: If you are a Palestinian, you would be well advised to run for your life, toward Israeli lines and Hamra Street. About 20 foreign doctors and nurses and two Palestinian male nurses stayed behind to tend to the 37 patients who could not be moved. Everyone else fled. Among those who ran were Taleb Alouki, the carpenter from Shatila, and his brother Fawzi. Earlier in the day, they managed to get back into the camp, to the shelter where they had left their neighbors the night before. Outside the shelter they found the bodies of 15 men who had been tied together with a rope, shot and scalped. 500 People Flee the Area The two brothers ran back to the Gaza Hospital, through the maze of buildings and alleyways that make up the refugee camps. When everyone fled at around noon, they recalled, they and about 400 to 500 other people dashed north, toward Corniche Mazraa, the main boulevard separating West Beirut proper from the Palestinian-controlled southern suburbs. This was also where the northern Israeli perimeter around the camps was situated. They sought refuge in the Warda al-Yazigi School, just south of Corniche Mazraa. It was by now early Friday afternoon. Sometime, either in the morning or early afternoon, the precise time cannot be established, a CBS News cameraman was on the perimeter of the Sabra camp, where he filmed a middle-aged Palestinian woman appealing to two Israeli soldiers to stop the killings going on inside the camps. 'Big Boss' Is Informed Some of this information had clearly filtered up to the Israeli command by this time. Sharon's statement before the Israeli Parliament, at about 11 A. Friday the Israeli division commander, Amos Yaron, met with General Drori and ' raised suspicions concerning the method of operation of the Phalangists. An Order to Halt Operation According to Mr. Sharon, General Drori then ordered the Phalangist liaison officer to halt the operation. It is clear from all accounts that by Friday afternoon things did quiet down somewhat in the camps but there were still fires raging and shooting going on, according to people who were on the scene. What happened next was probably the most controversial decision taken by the Israeli high command, save for sending the Phalangists into the camps in the first place. At 4:30 P. Friday afternoon, after General Drori was said by Mr. Sharon to have ordered an end to the operation, he and General Eytan met again with the Phalangists. At that time, Mr. Sharon said, it was ' agreed that all of the Phalangists would leave the refugee camps on Saturday morning. An Apparent Contradiction At this point, officials in Lebanon note, there appears to be a serious contradiction in Mr. Sharon's account of what happened. He said the Phalangists were ordered to stop their operations in the camps at 11 A. Friday. Yet at 4:30 P. they were told that they could stay in the camps until Saturday morning. Repeated efforts to interview General Drori to clarify this point were unsuccessful. The available evidence suggests that the operation was not halted on Friday, but that it may have been slowed down somewhat. Israeli officers in East Beirut said what happened at the 4:30 Friday meeting was that the Phalangists told the Israelis that they needed more time to ' clean up' the area. The Israelis said that instead of moving troops in to stop the militia operation, the Israeli command decided to give those militiamen already in the camp time to finish what they were at the same time, the Israelis decided to keep additional militiamen from moving into the camp. Some Phalangists Begin Leaving Lebanese Army sources confirmed that by Friday afternoon Phalangist units with trucks and halftracks began moving out of the airport back to their home bases, just as Mr. Sharon said. Inside the camps, the militiamen already on the scene continued with their work. At some time between 4 P. and 5 P. Friday a Reuters correspondent, Paul Eedle, spoke to an Israeli colonel at the Kuwaiti intersection and asked him about the operations taking place in the camp. The colonel, who declined to be identified, told Mr. Eedle that his men were working on the basis of two principles: that the Israeli Army should not get involved, but that the area should be ' purified. Sounds of gunfire and explosions could be heard emanating from the northern end of Shatila, witnesses recalled, and they could also be heard by Taleb Alouki and his brother Fawzi. They, along with 400 to 500 other people, had fled from Gaza Hospital in the afternoon when word came that the militiamen were advancing in their direction. They took shelter at the Al-Yazigi school, cowering in courtyards and classrooms. Some of the Palestinian civilians who tried to flee the camps for the safety of downtown say they were prevented from leaving by the Israelis outside the camps. The following account by the two brothers, was corroborated by the testimony of five other people who were later interviewed separately and independently of each other. Palestinians Decide to Run On Friday afternoon, with the sound of gunfire seeming to get closer to the school where they were hiding. the Alouki brothers and the others decided to make a run for Corniche Mazraa and the Israeli lines. The throng, showing a white flag, moved from the school up Rue Mohammed Ali Beyhum to Corniche Mazraa. As they approached the Israeli checkpoint on the main boulevard, kitty-corner to the Barbir Hospital, they were stopped by an Israeli soldier. The soldier, by all accounts, was clearly surprised and probably frightened to see all of these people coming at him. The soldier shouted in Arabic to the crowd to stay back, then went into crouch position at the corner of a building and aimed his gun at the people, who immediately started shrieking and turned around. Crowd Chooses a Spokesman The soldier, members of the crowd recalled, then told them to send one person forward to explain what they wanted. A man was chosen and sent to speak to the Israeli. According to the people, the spokesman told the soldier that Haddad militiamen were slaughtering civilians in the camps and that they were trying to escape. The Israeli soldier told the spokesman that there was nothing he could do, and added that if they remained in the area, he would open fire. People began protesting; women started weeping. The Israeli soldier then reportedly fired two volleys into the air to scatter the crowd. At that point, witnesses say, an Israeli tank rolled from Corniche Mazraa onto Rue Mohammed Ali Beyhum and chased the people a few hundred feet back toward the camps. A Witness Corroborates Account Reporters who went to the intersection last Thursday afternoon found a Lebanese man who lived in a first-floor apartment who said he had seen the entire episode from his balcony. He confirmed the refugees' story without any prompting. If the refugees' account is true, it would appear that by Friday afternoon the Israeli commanders had given no order to allow civilians fleeing the scene to pass through the perimeter set up around the camps by the Israeli Army. If we went one way we ran into the Israelis; if we went the other way we ran into the Haddad men. Taleb Alouki said. so we all just decided to turn around and hide in the school. Almost a week later, they were still there. A First Inkling of the Horror It was Friday afternoon that officials at the United States Embassy in Beirut first got an inkling that something was terribly wrong in the Palestinian refugee camps. A group of American journalists happened to stop by the embassy around 3 P. to speak with a member of the staff. In the exchange, one of the journalists mentioned that he had heard rumors that Phalangists had entered the Shatila camp. The charge d'affaires, Robert Barret, who was in Baabda, was immediately alerted, diplomats say. The diplomats said that Mr. Barret contacted Amin Gemayel, who had succeeded his slain brother as Phalangist Party leader. They said Mr. Gemayel told them that he did not know if Phalangist militiamen were in the camps, but that he would check. This and other evidence suggests that the Phalange Party leadership, including Mr. Geymayel, the new President, may not have known what the militiamen were doing. SATURDAY At 9 A. Saturday, a member of the United States Embassy staff entered Shatila, established that a massacre had taken place and informed his superiors. Sometime between late Friday afternoon and Saturday morning, the militiamen in the camp appear to have made a concerted, but somewhat sloppy, attempt to cover at least some of their tracks. Many buildings were bulldozed atop the bodies inside them. Some bodies were bulldozed into huge sandpiles, with arms and legs poking out in spots. In some areas the militiamen made neat piles of rubble and corrugated iron sheets to hide the corpses. It is also possible, judging from the number of buildings that had their facades ripped off, or huge bites taken out of them by bulldozers, that the militiamen were seeking to make many buildings uninhabitable so the surviving residents could not return. Men With Bullhorns Arrive Zaki F., the Palestinian living near Gaza Hospital, and a neighbor, Um Fatmi, 40 years old, and her four daughters had locked themselves in their homes in the Sabra camp when, around around 6 A. Saturday, men with bullhorns came through. The men identified themselves as Israelis and said that people had to come out. They added that no one had any reason to be fearful. The figures with bullhorns turned out to be militiamen. When I came out. Zaki recalled. I could tell the man was speaking with a Lebanese accent and was not an Israeli at all. He said, Come with me or I will shoot. Men, women, girls and young boys were all rounded up by the militiamen. Some 500 to 600 people, possibly even more, were then herded together and marched at gunpoint down to the main street of Shatila, where they were forced to sit along the road. Beside them were a number of corpses that had already begun to decay. Zaki recalled that one of the militiamen said to another. Why are you bringing them all at once? Why not bring them few by few so we can finish them off today. The one he was speaking to answered that the Israelis are going to ask about all the people in Shatila so why not give them to them and say they are from Shatila. Zaki said. Saleh H., 55 years old, was part of the group. One of the things that he said struck him was how some of the militiamen called each other by Christian names, such as Butros, while others addressed one another as Ali and Abbas, which are Shiite Moslem names and further circumstantial evidence that some of them may have been members of Major Haddad's militia. With all of these refugees now collected in Shatila, the final act was about to take place at the Gaza Hospital, where some 20 foreign doctors and nurses and two Palestinian medics were still caring for 37 patients. Hospital Is Ordered Evacuated At about 7 A. M., members of the medical staff recalled, six or seven militiamen came to the hospital and ordered everyone out. We told them that we could not leave the patients. said Miss Uluf, the Dutch nurse. so they said two of us could stay behind to look after them. They were very well equipped. she recalled. Some of them had those Israeli kind of helmets with the webbing on them and, in fact, at first we thought they were Israelis. They said we had to march with them. As we got closer and closer to Shatila, we saw more and more of these militiamen, some of them in black berets. Some Phalangist militiamen are known to favor black berets. Hiding with the group of foreign medical workers were the two Palestinian male nurses who were trying to slip though the net of the militiamen. They were very frightened. Dr. Maehlumshagen recalled. When we entered the Shatila camp, we discovered all of these peole sitting along the main street. As we marched along, one of the militiamen pulled one of the Palestinian nurses out of the line and asked his identity. We asked them what they were going to do with him. the doctor said. the militiaman said, You do your job and I will do mine. They then took the man around a corner and we heard shots. That is all we know. Along the way, the other Palestinian male nurse was pulled out of line as well, witnesses said. His fate is also unknown. An Execution in the Street Several witnesses said that at one point, a man wearing a blue hospital uniform in the group of foreigners from Gaza Hospital was stopped by the militiamen and asked his nationality. When he replied ' Syrian. the militiamen gunned him down in the middle of the street, in front of everyone. Somewhere along the way. Miss Uluf said. we came upon an Israeli officer who asked where we were being taken. The militiaman in charge, wearing a black beret, told the Israeli, First they come with me and then they go with you. That is what happened, according to Miss Uluf. The doctors and nurses were taken to the Phalangist outpost at the business school near the traffic rotary and were made to sit on the floor. A Lecture From a Phalangist A militiaman gave them a lecture, saying. We are not fascists or racists, but respect the Geneva conventions. At one point Miss Uluf said, said, while their passports were being checked and they were being berated for working in a ' terrorist hospital. an ambulance drove up. They took this trembling Palestinian boy out of the ambulance and said to us, See how well we treat Palestinians. the nurse said. When each member of the medical team had had his or her identity papers checked by the militiamen, they were allowed to cross the street to the Israeli lines, where they were given fruit, food and water and released. Two of them were subsequently allowed to return to the hospital to hel care for the patients still there. Meanwhile, back in the Shatila camp, the militiamen were busy separating Lebanese and Palestinians they had taken prisoner, with men forced to sit along one part of the main street; the women along another. It was about 7:30 A. Women Begin Screaming According to Um Fatmi and her four daughters, a number of men were taken off, their arms behind their heads. Some were taken behind piles of sand. Shots were heard. When the women began screaming, some of the men would be brought back to quiet them down. According to both Colonel Prince, the Lebanese Army Surgeon General, and a United Nations observer who saw the more than 300 corpses discovered in Shatila so far, it was clear from the relative states of decomposition that some people had been slain as early as Thursday and others as late as Saturday morning. Some bodies were found bloated and already decaying, the blood that covered them congealed in a dark stain. Others looked as though they had just been shot and had barely decomposed at all, such as a 90-year-old man, Hada Nouri, who was found at the side of the road, his cane at his side. Diplomat Describes a Scenario One Western diplomat who viewed the corpses said that what he found especially horrifying that was that people had evidently been ' marched up to a wall and confronted with the horror of what they were going to look like moments before they themselves were shot. Around 8 A. Saturday, according to Zaki F., the men were ordered to march out of the camp and up the hill. Just outside the gate, he said, was a Land-Rover with Christian militiamen inside. Each man had to pass by the vehicle in single file, apparently for purposes of identification. Some were pulled out of line and forced to sit in a ditch. According to people in the camps, some of the men who were massed there that morning have not returned. As the men marched out of the camp they saw about a dozen trucks full of militiamen lining the side of the hill up to the Kuwaiti Embassy traffic circle, apparently preparing to leave the area. A Difficult Story to Confirm At some point, according to the testimony of the women who went into a panic when the men were marched off, two men they thought were Israelis came to the gate of the camp and said the men were being taken to the stadium and that all the women could go home. Given the semi-hysterical state some of these people were in, this story proved difficult to confirm. One thing is certain: the women and children were all released, and most of the men were marched off to the sports complex. On the way to the stadium. according to several people in the crowd of men being delivered by the militiamen to the Israelis, an explosion took place, killing a man and his young son and wounding several others. No one seems really sure of what happened. One story is that a grenade was thrown into the group; another, that someone stepped on an unexploded cluster-bomb shell near the stadium. A Feeling of Reassurance All that is certain is that there was an explosion and some of the men were killed and injured. When we got near the Kuwaiti Embassy we were very relieved because we saw Israeli soldiers and knew we would not be killed. Zaki F. said. At some point on the way to the sports stadium, the militiamen moved away and turned the men over to the Israelis. The Israelis asked the men to sit under a stadium tier, tended to the wounded and gave everyone food and water. In his statement to the Israeli Parliament, Defense Minister Sharon said that on Saturday morning, the Phalangist forces left the areas of the refugee camps, which jibes with the eyewitness accounts. Then, Mr. Sharon said, information began to arrive about the killings in the Shatila camp. On the basis of this information, he said, General Drori ordered the Israeli Army to take up positions in Fakhani district and later in the Sabra camp in order to protect the population and ' put them at ease. Israelis Say They Were Greeted Both Mr. Sharon and reporters who watched the Israelis move in said the Israeli Army was greeted warmly by the local Palestinian populace. Sharon said General Drori ordered the Israel Defense Forces to stay out of the Shatila camp so that it ' would not be linked to the events that occurred there. According to the men gathered at the stadium, while they were sitting there, awaiting interrogation, an Arabic-speaking Israeli asked them through a bullhorn whether there was anyone there from Shatila. No one aswered. The Israeli soldier then asked whether or not the men understood Arabic and repeated his question. No one answered. The men say that there were some present from the Shatila camp, but that they were afraid to speak up. Invitations to a Private Chat Finally the Israeli soldier asked if there was anyone there from around Shatila. Several elderly men raised their hands and were asked to come out for a private chat, with an officer and translator. According to witnesses, two Israeli soldiers spoke with the men for some time. What they discussed is not known, but they say that the Arabic-speaking Israeli who did the translating threw down his hat in disgust when the interrogation ended, while the Israeli commander slapped his hands together in apparent anger. It is possible that this was the first time these two Israelis learned the full extent of what had happened the Shatila camp. Whatever the Israelis knew about the massacre by Saturday morning, and however disturbed they were by the events, some of the Palestinians say the Israeli soldiers threatened to turn them over to the Phalangists if they did not cooperate. 'Don't Worry About Anything' Saleh H., 55, quotes an Israeli soldier as telling him at the stadium. You are now under the protection of the Israeli defense forces. Don't worry about anything, just be honest with us. If we find out you are not honest. He said the soldier added. the Phalangists are here. Mr. Saleh said the Israeli soldier then motioned toward the area from where the Phalangists had brought them to the stadium. Finally Ahmed, 27 years old, a teacher at the school of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Sabra camp, was asked by an Israeli if he knew any guerrillas. I told him I knew a lot but they left when the P. guerrillas left. he recalled. I told him I did know some of the Palestinian militiamen still in the camp. I said all this after he promised not to take me to the Phalangists. The First Corpses Are Found On that Saturday morning, a reporter arrived at the sport stadium and observed the men, apparently from Sabra and Shatila sitting under the concrete stadium tier. They all looked very worried but also very quiet. A few miles away, around 9 A. M., the first outsiders were entering Shatila and discovering the bodies. The Israeli officer in charge of the stadium interrogations, Col. Naftali Bahiry, was asked if there was any truth to reports that Phalangists were in the area of the camps. We asked the Phalangists to leave. said the colonel. We don't need anyone to do the job for us. EPILOGUE When the Palestine Liberation Organization completed its withdrawal from West Beirut on Sept. 1, most officials agree that it actually pulled out more than 11, 000 men. From that day until Sept. 15, the day the Israeli Army invaded West Beirut, Defense Minister Sharon and other senior Israeli officials repeatedly asserted that the P. had left 2, 000 guerrillas behind. They said that these guerrillas were in plainclothes and were hiding with Lebanese Moslem militiamen in West Beirut. The Israeli Government complained to the United States about these supposedly hidden guerrillas, and Washington, according to the Israeli radio, replied that while there were P. personnel left in behind in West Beirut, they were attached to the P. diplomatic mission there, established in 1964 and fully recognized by the Lebanese Government. Its director, Shafik al-Hout, had ambassadorial status, Washington reportedly said, and the 100 P. functionaries working in the mission were there with the express permission of Lebanon. Role of the P. Personnel The P. people, the United States told Israel, were to assist Palestinian families whose breadwinners had been evacuated from the city and to supervise the transfer of P. arms and ammunition to the Lebanese Army. In addition to the Palestinians working in the diplomatic mission, there were also Palestinian militiamen. For the most part, they were Palestinian youths born in Lebanon who acted as a civil guard, maintaining order and protecting the camps. As part-time civilian fighters, they were not considered guerrillas under the Habib agreement. According to the pact, any combatant such as these militiamen who laid down his or her arms and was found acceptable to the Lebanese Government could stay behind in Lebanon. Most of these militiamen met this requirement and did stay behind, since Lebanon was, for all intents and purposes, their home. Israeli Officer's Recollection Col. Naftali Bahiry, an Israeli officer in charge of interrogating men who had been rounded up from the camps, confirmed that ' far more than half' were simply Palestinian militiamen who he expected would be released. Colonel Bahiry, interviewed after the massacre, added that only a small percentage were suspected of being P. guerrillas who had been ordered to stay behind in violation of the Habib agreement. In summary, the Israelis do not appear to have found, nor do there appear to have been, 2, 000 P. guerrillas who remained behind in West Beirut. Clearly there were some, but the weight of the evidence suggests that the number was in the low hundreds at most.
It was 33 years ago, in September 1982, that large numbers of Palestinians – estimates vary from 700 to a few thousand – were slaughtered in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by members of the Phalange militia amid Israeli collusion and assistance. Israels Kahan commission, tasked with investigating the massacre, found that Israels defense minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, bore personal responsibility for allowing the Phalangists into the camps without taking any measures to prevent the massacre. He was forced to resign as defense minister but was later elected prime minister. Sharon died in 2014 without ever facing justice, despite sustained but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to prosecute him in Belgium under the countrys universal jurisdiction laws. Amos Yaron, who commanded the Israeli armys forward post on the roof of a building 200 meters from Shatila, was disciplined by being moved out of operational roles for three years after the Kahan report but in 1999 ended up director-general of Israels Defense Ministry. While Israel never held its officials accountable, Lebanon has done even less to shed light on the role of the Lebanese perpetrators. The Kahan commission – in the absence of a Lebanese investigation – found that the Phalange unit that entered the camp was an intelligence unit headed by Elie Hobeika. Yaron told the Kahan commission that Hobeika himself did not go into the camps but was on the roof of the forward command post during the night. One of the Israeli soldiers who was on the roof told the commission that he heard a Phalangist officer inside the camps tell Hobeika over the radio that there were 50 women and children, and ask what should he do. Hobeikas reported reply over the radio was: “This is the last time youre going to ask me a question like that. You know exactly what to do. ” Nevertheless, after the war, Hobeika was elected to Parliament for two terms and served as a government minister multiple times. His crimes – particularly his role in Sabra and Shatila – were never investigated in Lebanon or elsewhere. He was assassinated in 2002. A day before his murder, Hobeika had told two visiting Belgian senators that he was willing to go to Brussels to testify in the Belgian court case against Sharon. The identity of the killers of Hobeika – a man with many enemies – was never established. Hobeika is not the only one who evaded justice in Lebanon. Like him, Lebanons warlords benefitted from a general amnesty at the end of the conflict in 1990, as he did, and traded their military fatigues for fancy suits and ministerial portfolios. Attempts to overturn Lebanons legacy of impunity since the end of the war have generally failed to generate momentum. There are still no national monuments for civilian victims of the war, no national commission to provide the families of the disappeared with answers about the fate of their loved ones, and no prosecution for the multiple massacres that took place. One of the few serious judicial efforts to prosecute militia members for wartime kidnappings – the case of Mahieldeen Hashisho, who disappeared over 30 years ago – was dismissed by a Lebanese court for lack of evidence in September 2013. Some activists and intellectuals have tried to challenge this collective amnesia through their artistic production. For example, a 2005 documentary by Monika Borgman and Lokman Slim told the story of the Sabra and Shatila massacres through the testimony of six former Phalange militiamen who participated. Yet, these important efforts have generally remained solitary cries in the wilderness. Part of the challenge in Lebanon has been how to deal with the violent legacy of the past while confronting an ever-violent present. How to hold past perpetrators accountable when more recent crimes – the new rounds of political fighting in May 2008 or more recently in Tripoli, for example – go unpunished. And yet, it may be that the only way out of Lebanons never-ending cycle of violence and impunity, is to finally deal head-on with the past. It is too late to hold Hobeika accountable, but it is not too late to ask questions about his role and that of his men in the massacre. Such questions about the past are the essential first step to end the rampant impunity and complacency in the country. Up until a few weeks ago it seemed almost hopeless to expect any popular mobilization around such issues in Lebanons fragmented politics. Yet, the recent citizenship movement around the garbage crisis with its strong undercurrent of demands for accountability and transparency from a corrupt political class sends a strong signal that all is not lost. War criminals who killed with impunity in the past cannot be expected to govern responsibly in the present.
This article is about the 1982 massacre. For the 1985–88 events, see War of the Camps. Sabra and Shatila massacre Part of the Lebanese Civil War Bodies of victims of the massacre in the Sabra and the Shatila refugee camp  Location West Beirut, Lebanon Coordinates 3351′46″N 3529′54″E. 33. 8628N 35. 4984E Coordinates: 3351′46″N 3529′54″E. 33. 4984E Date 16–18 September 1982 Target Sabra and the Shatila refugee camp Attack type Massacre Deaths 460  to 3, 500  number disputed) Perpetrators Kataeb Party militia under Elie Hobeika The Sabra and Shatila massacre (also known as the Sabra and Chatila massacre) 4] 5] was the killing of between 460 and 3, 500 civilians, mostly Palestinians and Lebanese Shiites, by a militia close to the Kataeb Party, also called Phalange, a predominantly Christian Lebanese right-wing party in the Sabra neighborhood and the adjacent Shatila refugee camp in Beirut, Lebanon. From approximately 18:00 on 16 September to 08:00 on 18 September 1982, a widespread massacre was carried out by the militia under the eyes of their Israeli allies.  7] 8] 9] The Phalanges, allies to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were ordered by the IDF to clear out Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters from Sabra and Shatila, as part of the IDF maneuvering into West Beirut. The IDF received reports of some of the Phalanges atrocities in Sabra and Shatila but did not take any action to prevent or stop the massacre.  The massacre was presented as retaliation for the assassination of newly elected Lebanese president Bachir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Kataeb Party. It was wrongly assumed by the Phalangists that Palestinian militants had carried out the assassination. In June 1982, the Israel Defense Forces had invaded Lebanon with the intention of rooting out the PLO. By mid-1982, under the supervision of the Multinational Force, the PLO withdrew from Lebanon following weeks of battles in West Beirut and shortly before the massacre took place. Various forces — Israeli, Phalangists and possibly also the South Lebanon Army (SLA) — were in the vicinity of Sabra and Shatila at the time of the slaughter, taking advantage of the fact that the Multinational Force had removed barracks and mines that had encircled Beirut's predominantly Muslim neighborhoods and kept the Israelis at bay during the Beirut siege.  The Israeli advance over West Beirut in the wake of the PLO withdrawal, which enabled the Phalangist raid, was considered a violation of the ceasefire agreement between the various forces.  The Israeli Army surrounded Sabra and Shatila and stationed troops at the exits of the area to prevent camp residents from leaving and, at the Phalangists' request, 13] fired illuminating flares at night.  15] According to Alain Menargues, the direct perpetrators of the killings were the " Young Men. a gang recruited by Elie Hobeika, a prominent figure in the Phalanges, the Lebanese Forces intelligence chief and liaison officer with Mossad, from men who had been expelled from the Lebanese Forces for insubordination or criminal activities.  The killings are widely believed to have taken place under Hobeika's direct orders. Hobeika's family and fiancée had been murdered by Palestinian militiamen, and their Lebanese allies, at the Damour massacre of 1976, 17] 18] itself a response to the 1976 Karantina massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims at the hands of Christian militants. Hobeika later became a long-serving Member of the Parliament of Lebanon and served in several ministerial roles.  Other Phalangist commanders involved were Joseph Edde from South Lebanon, Dib Anasta, head of the Phalangist Military Police, Michael Zouein, and Maroun Mischalani from East Beirut. In all 300–400 militiamen were involved, including some from Sa'ad Haddad 's South Lebanon Army.  In 1983, a commission chaired by Seán MacBride, the assistant to the UN Secretary General and President of United Nations General Assembly at the time, concluded that Israel, as the camp's occupying power, bore responsibility for the violence.  The commission also concluded that the massacre was a form of genocide.  In 1983, the Israeli Kahan Commission, appointed to investigate the incident, found that Israeli military personnel, aware that a massacre was in progress, had failed to take serious steps to stop it. The commission deemed Israel indirectly responsible, and Ariel Sharon, then Defense Minister, bore personal responsibility "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" forcing him to resign.  Background From 1975 to 1990, groups in competing alliances with neighboring countries fought against each other in the Lebanese Civil War. Infighting and massacres between these groups claimed several thousand victims. Examples: the Syrian-backed Karantina massacre (January 1976) by the Kataeb and its allies against Kurds, Syrians and Palestinians in the predominantly Muslim slum district of Beirut; Damour (January 1976) by the PLO against Christian Maronites, including the family and fiancée of the Lebanese Forces intelligence chief Elie Hobeika; and Tel al-Zaatar (August 1976) by Phalangists and their allies against Palestinian refugees living in a camp administered by UNRWA. The total death toll in Lebanon for the whole civil war period was around 150, 000 victims.  The PLO had been attacking Israel from southern Lebanon and Israel had been bombing PLO positions in southern Lebanon since the early 1970s till early 1980s.  26] The casus belli cited by the Israeli side to declare war, however, was an assassination attempt, on 3 June 1982, made upon Israeli Ambassador to Britain Shlomo Argov. The attempt was the work of the Iraq -based Abu Nidal, possibly with Syrian or Iraqi involvement.  28] Historians and observers  30] such as David Hirst and Benny Morris have commented that the PLO could not have been involved in the assault, or even approved of it: Abu Nidal's group was, after all, a bitter rival to Arafat's PLO and even murdered some of its members.  The PLO also issued a condemnation of the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador.  Nonetheless Israel used the event as a justification to break the ceasefire with the PLO, and as a casus belli for a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.  33] After the war, Israel presented its actions as a response to terrorism being carried out by the PLO from several fronts, including from the border with Lebanon.  35] However, the aforementioned historians have argued that the PLO was respecting the ceasefire agreement then in force with Israel and keeping the border between the Jewish state and Lebanon more stable than it had been for a period of over a decade.  During that ceasefire, which lasted 8 months, UNIFIL — the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon — reported that not a single act of provocation against Israel had been launched by the PLO.  The Israeli government tried out several justifications to ditch the ceasefire and attack the PLO, at some point even eliciting accusations from the Israeli opposition that "demagogy" from the government threatened to pull Israel into war.  All such justifications, before the attempted assassination of the ambassador, had been shot down by its ally, the United States, as insufficient reason to launch a war against the PLO.  On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon moving northwards to surround the capital, Beirut.  Following an extended siege of the city, the fighting was brought to an end with a U. S. -brokered agreement between the parties on 21 August 1982, which allowed for safe evacuation of the Palestinian fighters from the city under the supervision of Western nations and guaranteed the protection of refugees and the civilian residents of the refugee camps.  On 15 June 1982, 10 days after the start of the invasion, the Israeli Cabinet passed a proposal put forward by the Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, that the IDF should not enter West Beirut but this should be done by Lebanese Forces. Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, had already issued orders that the Lebanese predominantly Christian, right-wing militias should not take part in the fighting and the proposal was to counter public complaints that the IDF were suffering casualties whilst their allies were standing by.  The subsequent Israeli inquiry estimated the strength of militias in West Beirut, excluding Palestinians, to be around 7, 000. They estimated the Phalange to be 5, 000 when fully mobilized of whom 2, 000 were full-time.  On 23 August 1982, Bachir Gemayel, leader of the right-wing Lebanese Forces, was elected President of Lebanon by the National Assembly. Israel had relied on Gemayel and his forces as a counterbalance to the PLO, and as a result, ties between Israel and Maronite groups, from which hailed many of the supporters of the Lebanese Forces, had grown stronger.  42] 43] By 1 September, the PLO fighters had been evacuated from Beirut under the supervision of Multinational Force.  44] The evacuation was conditional on the continuation of the presence of the MNF to provide security for the community of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  Two days later the Israeli Premier Menachem Begin met Gemayel in Nahariya and strongly urged him to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Begin also wanted the continuing presence of the SLA in southern Lebanon ( Haddad supported peaceful relations with Israel) in order to control attacks and violence, and action from Gemayel to move on the PLO fighters which Israel believed remained a hidden threat in Lebanon. However, the Phalangists, who were previously united as reliable Israeli allies, were now split because of developing alliances with Syria, which remained militarily hostile to Israel. As such, Gemayel rejected signing a peace treaty with Israel and did not authorize operations to root out the remaining PLO militants.  On 11 September 1982, the international forces that were guaranteeing the safety of Palestinian refugees left Beirut. Then on 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated in a massive explosion which demolished his headquarters. Eventually, the culprit, Habib Tanious Shartouni, a Lebanese Christian, confessed to the crime. He turned out to be a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and an agent of Syrian intelligence. Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim leaders denied any connection to him.  On the evening of 14 September, following the news that Bashir Gemayel had been assassinated, Prime Minister Begin, Minister for Defence Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan agreed that the Israeli army should invade West Beirut. The public reason given was to be that they were there to prevent chaos. In a separate conversation, at 20:30 that evening, Sharon and Eitan agreed that the IDF should not enter the Palestinian refugee camps but that the Phalange should be used.  The only other member of the cabinet who was consulted was Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.  Shortly after 6. 00 am 15 September, the Israeli army entered West Beirut, 49] This Israeli action breached its agreement with the United States not to occupy West Beirut  and was in violation of the ceasefire.  Fawwaz Traboulsi writes that while the massacre was presented as a reaction to the assassination of Bachir, it represented the posthumous achievement of his "radical solution" to Palestinians in Lebanon, who he thought of as "people too many" in the region. Later, the Israeli army's monthly journal Skira Hodechith wrote that the Lebanese Forces hoped to provoke "the general exodus of the Palestinian population" and aimed to create a new demographic balance in Lebanon favouring the Christians.  Attack On the night of 14/15 September 1982 the IDF chief of staff Raphael Eitan flew to Beirut where he went straight to the Phalangists' headquarters and instructed their leadership to order a general mobilisation of their forces and prepare to take part in the forthcoming Israeli attack on West Beirut. He also ordered them to impose a general curfew on all areas under their control and appoint a liaison officer to be stationed at the IDF forward command post. He told them that the IDF would not enter the refugee camps but that this would be done by the Phalangist forces. The militia leaders responded that the mobilisation would take them 24 hours to organise.  On morning of Wednesday 15 September Israeli Defence Minister, Sharon, who had also travelled to Beirut, held a meeting with Eitan at the IDF's forward command post, on the roof of a five-storey building 200 metres southwest of Shatila camp. Also in attendance were Sharon's aide Avi Duda'i, the Director of Military Intelligence - Yehoshua Saguy, a senior Mossad officer, General Amir Drori, General Amos Yaron, an Intelligence officer, the Head of GSS – Avraham Shalom, the Deputy Chief of Staff – General Moshe Levi and other senior officers. It was agreed that the Phalange should go into the camps.  According to the Kahan Commission report throughout Wednesday, R. P. G. and light-weapons fire from the Sabra and Shatilla camps was directed at this forward command post, and continued to a lesser degree on Thursday and Friday (16–17 September. It also added that by Thursday morning, the fighting had ended and all was 'calm and quiet. 55] Following the assassination of Lebanese Christian President Bachir Gemayel, the Phalangists sought revenge. By noon on 15 September, Sabra and Shatila had been surrounded by the IDF, which set up checkpoints at the exits and entrances, and used a number of multi-story buildings as observation posts. Amongst them was the seven-story Kuwaiti embassy which, according to TIME magazine, had "an unobstructed and panoramic view" of Sabra and Shatila. Hours later, IDF tanks began shelling Sabra and Shatila.  The following morning, 16 September, the sixth IDF order relating to the attack on West Beirut was issued. It specified: The refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists/Lebanese Army. 56] According to Linda Malone of the Jerusalem Fund, Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan  met with Phalangist militia units and invited them to enter Sabra and Shatila, claiming that the PLO was responsible for Gemayel's assassination.  The meeting concluded at 15:00 on 16 September.  Shatila had previously been one of the PLO's three main training camps for foreign fighters and the main training camp for European fighters.  The Israelis maintained that 2, 000 to 3, 000 terrorists remained in the camps, but were unwilling to risk the lives of more of their soldiers after the Lebanese army repeatedly refused to "clear them out. 60] No evidence was offered for this claim. There were only a small number of forces sent into the camps and they suffered minimal casualties.  39 Two Phalangists were wounded, one in the leg and another in the hand.  Investigations after the massacre found few weapons in the camps.  39  Thomas Friedman, who entered the camps on Saturday, mostly found groups of young men with their hands and feet bound, who had been then lined up and machine-gunned down gang-land style, not typical he thought of the kind of deaths the reported 2, 000 terrorists in the camp would have put up with.  An hour later, 1, 500 militiamen assembled at Beirut International Airport, then occupied by Israel. Under the command of Elie Hobeika, they began moving towards the area in IDF-supplied jeeps, some bearing weapons provided by Israel, 63] following Israeli guidance on how to enter it. The forces were mostly Phalangist, though there were some men from Saad Haddad 's "Free Lebanon forces. 48] According to Ariel Sharon and Elie Hobeika's bodyguard, the Phalangists were given "harsh and clear" warnings about harming civilians.  64] However, it was by then known that the Phalangists presented a special security risk for Palestinians. It was published in the edition of 1 September of Bamahane, the IDF newspaper, that a Phalangist told an Israeli official. T]he question we are putting to ourselves is — how to begin, by raping or killing. 65] A US envoy to the Middle East expressed horror after being told of Sharon's plans to send the Phalangists inside the camps, and Israeli officials themselves acknowledged the situation could trigger "relentless slaughter. 12] The first unit of 150 Phalangists entered Sabra and Shatila at 18:00. A battle ensued that at times Palestinians claim involved lining up Palestinians for execution.  During the night, the Israeli forces fired illuminating flares over the area. According to a Dutch nurse, the camp was as bright as "a sports stadium during a football game. 66] At 19:30, the Israeli Cabinet convened and was informed that the Phalangist commanders had been informed that their men must participate in the operation and fight, and enter the extremity of Sabra, while the IDF would guarantee the success of their operation though not participate in it. The Phalangists were to go in there "with their own methods. After Gemayel's assassination there were two possibilities, either the Phalange would collapse or they would undertake revenge, having killed Druze for that reason earlier that day. With regard to this second possibility, it was noted, it will be an eruption the likes of which has never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for. Revenge' was what Bashir Gemayel's brother had called for at the funeral earlier. Levy commented: the Phalangists are already entering a certain neighborhood – and I know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaughter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and we will bear the blame. Therefore, I think that we are liable here to get into a situation in which we will be blamed, and our explanations will not stand up. 55] The press release that followed reads: In the wake of the assassination of the President-elect Bashir Jemayel, the I. D. F. has seized positions in West Beirut in order to forestall the danger of violence, bloodshed and chaos, as some 2, 000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons, have remained in Beirut, in flagrant violation of the evacuation agreement. An Israeli intelligence officer present in the forward post, wishing to obtain information about the Phalangists' activities, ordered two distinct actions to find out what was happening. The first failed to turn up anything. The second resulted in a report at 20:00 from the roof, stated that the Phalangists' liaison officer had heard from an operative inside the camp that he held 45 people and asked what he should do with him. The liaison officer told him to more or less "Do the will of God. The Intelligence Officer received this report at approximately 20:00 from the person on the roof who heard the conversation. He did not pass on the report.  At roughly the same time or a little earlier at 19:00, Lieutenant Elul testified that he had overheard a radio conversation between one of the militia men in the camp and his commander Hobeika in which the former asking what he was to do with 50 women and children who had been taken prisoner. Hobeika's reply was: This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that; you know exactly what to do. Other Phalangists on the roof started laughing. Amongst the Israelis there was Brigadier General Yaron, Divisional Commander, who asked Lieutenant Elul, his Chef de Bureau, what the laughter was about; Elul translated what Hobeika had said. Yaron then had a five-minute conversation, in English, with Hobeika. What was said is unknown.  67] The Kahan Commission determined that the evidence pointed to 'two different and separate reports' noting that Yaron maintained that he thought they referred to the same incident, and that it concerned 45 "dead terrorists. At the same time, 20:00, a third report came in from liaison officer G. of the Phalangists who in the presence of numerous Israeli officers, including general Yaron, in the dining room, stated that within 2 hours the Phalangists had killed 300 people, including civilians. He returned sometime later and changed the number from 300 to 120.  At 20:40, General Yaron held a briefing, and after it the Divisional Intelligence Officer stated that it appeared no terrorists were in the Shatila camp, and that the Phalangists were in two minds as to what to do with the women, children and old people they had massed together, either to lead them somewhere else or that they were told, as the liaison officer was overheard saying, to 'do what your heart tells you, because everything comes from God. Yaron interrupted the officer and said he'd checked and that 'they have no problems at all. and that with regard to the people, It will not, will not harm them. Yaron later testified he had been skeptical of the reports and had in any case told the Phalangists not to harm civilians.  At 21:00 Maj. Amos Gilad, predicted during a discussion at Northern Command that rather than a cleansing of terrorists, what would take place was a massacre, informing higher commanders that already between 120-300 had already been killed by that time.  At 23:00 the same evening, a report was sent to the IDF headquarters in East Beirut, reporting the killings of 300 people, including civilians. The report was forwarded to headquarters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and to the office of the Bureau Chief of the director of Military Intelligence, Lt. Col. Hevroni, at 05:30 the following day where it was seen by more than 20 senior Israeli officers. It was then forwarded to his home by 06:15.  55] That same morning an IDF historian copied down a note, which later disappeared, which he had found in the Northern Command situation room in Aley. During the night the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. Even though it was agreed that they would not harm civilians, they 'butchered. They did not operate in orderly fashion but dispersed. They had casualties, including two killed. They will organize to operate in a more orderly manner – we will see to it that they are moved into the area. 55] Early on that morning, between 08:00 and 09:00, several IDF soldiers stationed nearby noted killings were being conducted against the camp refugees. A deputy tank commander some 180 metres (200 yd) away, Lieutenant Grabowski, saw two Phalangistists beating two young men, who were then taken back into the camp, after which shots rang out, and the soldiers left. Sometime later, he saw the Phalangists had killed a group of five women and children. When he expressed a desire to make report, the tank crew said they had already heard a communication informing the battalion commander that civilians had been killed, and that the latter had replied, We know, it's not to our liking, and don't interfere. 55] At around 08:00, military correspondent Ze'ev Schiff received a tip-off a source in the General Staff in Tel Aviv that there had been a slaughter in the camps. Checking round for some hours, he got no confirmation other than that there "there's something. At 11:00 he met with Mordechai Tzipori, Minister of Communications and conveyed his information. Unable to reach Military Intelligence by phone, he got in touch with Yitzhak Shamir at 11:19 asking him to check reports of a Phalangist slaughter in the camps.  Shamir testified that from his recollection the main thing Tzipori had told him of was that 3/4 IDF soldiers killed, no mention of a massacre or slaughter, as opposed to a "rampage" had been made. He made no check because his impression was that the point of the information was to keep him updated on IDF losses.  At a meeting with American diplomats at 12:30 Shamir made no mention of what Tzipori told him, saying he expected that he would hear from Ariel Sharon, the Military Intelligence chief and the American Morris Draper about the situation in West Beirut, 55] At that noontime meeting Sharon insisted that "terrorists" needed "mopping up. 71] Americans pressed for the intervention of the Lebanese National Army, and for an IDF withdrawal immediately. Sharon replied: I just don't understand, what are you looking for? Do you want the terrorists to stay? Are you afraid that somebody will think that you were in collusion with us? Deny it. We denied it, 71] adding that nothing would happen except perhaps for a few more terrorists being killed, which would be a benefit to all. Shamir and Sharon finally agreed to a gradual withdrawal, at the end of Rosh Hashana, two days later. Draper then warned them: Sure, the I. is going to stay in West Beirut and they will let the Lebanese go and kill the Palestinians in the camps.  Sharon replied: So, we'll kill them. They will not be left there. You are not going to save them. You are not going to save these groups of the international terrorism. If you don't want the Lebanese to kill them, we will kill them.  In the afternoon, before 16:00, Lieutenant Grabowski had one of his men ask a Phalangist why they were killing civilians, and was told that pregnant women will give birth to children who will grow up to be terrorists.  At Beirut airport at 16:00 journalist Ron Ben-Yishai heard from several Israeli officers that they had heard that killings had taken place in the camps. At 11:30 he telephoned Ariel Sharon to report on the rumours, and was told by Sharon that he had already heard of the stories from the Chief of Staff.  At 16:00 in a meeting with the Phalangist staff, with Mossad present, the Israeli Chief of Staff said he had a "positive impression" of their behavior in the field and from what the Phalangists reported, and asked them to continue 'mopping up the empty camps' until 5 am, whereupon they must desist due to American pressure. According to the Kahan Commission investigation, neither side explicitly mentioned to each other reports or rumours about the way civilians were being treated in the camp.  Between 18:00 and 20:00, Israeli Foreign Ministry personnel in Beirut and in Israel began receiving various reports from U. representatives that the Phalangists had been observed in the camps and that their presence was likely to cause problems. On returning to Israel, the Chief of Staff spoke to Ariel Sharon between 20:00 and 21:00, and according to Sharon, informed him that the "Lebanese had gone too far" and that "the Christians had harmed the civilian population more than was expected. This, he testified, was the first he had ever heard of Phalangist irregularities in the camps.  The Chief of Staff denied they had discussed any killings "beyond what had been expected. 55] Later in the afternoon, a meeting was held between the Israeli Chief of Staff and the Phalangist staff. On the morning of Friday, 17 September, the Israeli Army surrounding Sabra and Shatila ordered the Phalange to halt their operation, concerned about reports of a massacre.  Foreign reporters' testimonies On 17 September, while Sabra and Shatila still were sealed off, a few independent observers managed to enter. Among them were a Norwegian journalist and diplomat Gunnar Flakstad, who observed Phalangists during their cleanup operations, removing dead bodies from destroyed houses in the Shatila camp.  Many of the bodies found had been severely mutilated. Young men had been castrated, some were scalped, and some had the Christian cross carved into their bodies.  Janet Lee Stevens, an American journalist, later wrote to her husband, Dr. Franklin Lamb, I saw dead women in their houses with their skirts up to their waists and their legs spread apart; dozens of young men shot after being lined up against an alley wall; children with their throats slit, a pregnant woman with her stomach chopped open, her eyes still wide open, her blackened face silently screaming in horror; countless babies and toddlers who had been stabbed or ripped apart and who had been thrown into garbage piles. 74] Before the massacre, it was reported that the leader of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, had requested the return of international forces, from Italy, France and the United States, to Beirut to protect civilians. Those forces had just supervised the departure of Arafat and his PLO fighters from Beirut. Italy expressed 'deep concerns' about 'the new Israeli advance' but no action was taken to return the forces to Beirut.  The New York Times reported on September 1982: Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, demanded today that the United States, France and Italy send their troops back to Beirut to protect its inhabitants against Israel. The dignity of three armies and the honor of their countries is involved, Mr. Arafat said at his news conference. I ask Italy, France and the United States: What of your promise to protect the inhabitants of Beirut? Number of victims Memorial in Sabra, South Beirut The Lebanese army's chief prosecutor, Assad Germanos, investigated the killings, but following orders from above, did not summon Lebanese witnesses. Also Palestinian survivors from the camps were afraid to testify, and Phalangist fighters were expressly forbidden to give testimony. Germanos' report determined that 460 people had been killed (including 15 women and 12 children. Israeli intelligence estimated 700–800 dead, and the Palestinian Red Crescent claimed 2, 000 dead. 1, 200 death certificates were issued to anyone who produced three witnesses claiming a family member disappeared during the time of the massacre.  According to the BBC, at least 800" Palestinians died.  Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout in her Sabra and Shatila: September 1982  gives a minimum consisting of 1, 300 named victims based on detailed comparison of 17 victim lists and other supporting evidence, and estimates an even higher total. Robert Fisk wrote, After three days of rape, fighting and brutal executions, militias finally leave the camps with 1, 700 dead. 78] In his book published soon after the massacre, 79] the Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliouk of Le Monde Diplomatique, arrived at about 2, 000 bodies disposed of after the massacre from official and Red Cross sources and "very roughly" estimated 1, 000 to 1, 500 other victims disposed of by the Phalangists themselves to a total of 3, 000–3, 500. Postwar testimonies by Phalange operatives Lokhman Slim and Monika Borgman's Massaker, based on 90 hours of interviews with the LF soldiers who participated in the massacre, gives the participants' memories of how they were drawn into the militia, trained with the Israeli army and unleashed on the camps to take revenge for the murder of Bashir Gemayel. The motivations are varied, from blaming beatings from their fathers in childhood, the effects of the brutalization of war, obedience to one's leaders, a belief that the camp women would breed future terrorists, and the idea three quarters of the residents were terrorists. Others spoke of their violence without traces of repentance.  U. N. condemnation On 16 December 1982, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the massacre and declared it to be an act of genocide.  The voting record  83] 84] on section D of Resolution 37/123 was: yes: 123; no: 0; abstentions: 22; non-voting: 12. The delegate for Canada stated: The term genocide cannot, in our view, be applied to this particular inhuman act. 84] The delegate of Singapore – voting 'yes' – added: My delegation regrets the use of the term 'an act of genocide. as] the term 'genocide' is used to mean acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Canada and Singapore questioned whether the General Assembly was competent to determine whether such an event would constitute genocide.  The Soviet Union, by contrast, asserted that: The word for what Israel is doing on Lebanese soil is genocide. Its purpose is to destroy the Palestinians as a nation. 85] The Nicaragua delegate asserted: It is difficult to believe that a people that suffered so much from the Nazi policy of extermination in the middle of the twentieth century would use the same fascist, genocidal arguments and methods against other peoples. 85] The United States commented that "While the criminality of the massacre was beyond question, it was a serious and reckless misuse of language to label this tragedy genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention. 84] William Schabas, director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland, 86] stated: the term genocide. had obviously been chosen to embarrass Israel rather than out of any concern with legal precision. 84] MacBride commission The independent commission headed by Seán MacBride, however, did find that the concept of genocide applied to the case as it was the intention of those behind the massacre "the deliberate destruction of the national and cultural rights and identity of the Palestinian people. 87] Individual Jews throughout the world also denounced the massacre as genocide.  The MacBride commission's report, Israel in Lebanon, concluded that the Israeli authorities or forces were responsible in the massacres and other killings that have been reported to have been carried out by Lebanese militiamen in Sabra and Shatila in the Beirut area between 16 and 18 September.  Unlike the Israeli commission, the McBride commission did not work with the idea of separate degrees of responsibility, viz., direct and indirect. Israeli Kahan commission Israel's own Kahan commission found that only "indirect" responsibility befitted Israel's involvement. For British journalist David Hirst, Israel crafted the concept of indirect responsibility so as to make its involvement and responsibility seem smaller. He said of the Commission's verdict that it was only by means of errors and omissions in the analysis of the massacre that the Commission was able to reach the conclusion of indirect responsibility.  Sharon's "personal responsibility" for massacre The Kahan Commission concluded Israeli Defense minister Ariel Sharon bears personal responsibility "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and "not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed. Sharon's negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which had come under Israeli control, amounted to a non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged, and it was recommended that Sharon be dismissed as Defense Minister.  At first, Sharon refused to resign, and Begin refused to fire him. It was only after the death of Emil Grunzweig after a grenade was tossed by a right-wing Israeli into the dispersing crowd of a Peace Now protest march, which also injured ten others, that a compromise was reached: Sharon would resign as Defense Minister, but remain in the Cabinet as a minister without portfolio. Notwithstanding the dissuading conclusions of the Kahan report, Sharon would later become Prime Minister of Israel.  91] An opinion poll indicated that 51. 7% of the Israeli public thought the Commission was too harsh, and only 2. 17% too lenient.  Other conclusions The Kahan commission also recommended the dismissal of Director of Military Intelligence Yehoshua Saguy, 93] 94] and the effective promotion freeze of Division Commander Brig. Gen. Amos Yaron for at least three years.  Role of various parties The primary responsibility of the massacre is generally attributed to Elie Hobeika. Robert Maroun Hatem, Elie Hobeika 's bodyguard, stated in his book From Israel to Damascus that Hobeika ordered the massacre of civilians in defiance of Israeli instructions to behave like a "dignified" army.  Hobeika was assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut on 24 January 2002. Lebanese and Arab commentators blamed Israel for the murder of Hobeika, with alleged Israeli motive that Hobeika would be 'apparently poised to testify before the Belgian court about Sharon's role in the massacre  see section above. Prior to his assassination, Elie Hobeika had stated "I am very interested that the [Belgian] trial starts because my innocence is a core issue. 17] According to Alain Menargues, on 15 September, an Israeli special operations group of Sayeret Matkal entered the camp to liquidate a number of Palestinian cadres, and left the same day. It was followed the next day, by "killers" from the Sa'ad Haddad's South Lebanon Army, before the Lebanese Forces units of Elie Hobeika entered the camps.  97] 98] The US responsibility was considerable, 99] indeed the Arab states and the PLO blamed the US.  The negotiations under the mediation of US diplomat Philip Habib, which oversaw the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut, had assigned responsibility to the American-led Multi National Force for guaranteeing the safety of those non-combatant Palestinians who remained. The US administration was criticized for the early withdrawal of the Multi National Force, a criticism which George Shultz accepted later.  Shultz recounted in his memoirs that "The brutal fact is that we are partially responsible. We took the Israelis and Lebanese at their word. 101] On 20 September the Multi National Force was redeployed to Beirut.  Sharon libel suit Ariel Sharon sued Time magazine for libel in American and Israeli courts in a 50 million libel suit, after Time published a story in its 21 February 1983, issue, implying that Sharon had "reportedly discussed with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge" for Bachir's assassination.  The jury found the article false and defamatory, although Time won the suit in the U. court because Sharon's defense failed to establish that the magazine's editors and writers had "acted out of malice. as required under the U. libel law.  Relatives of victims sue Sharon After Sharon's 2001 election to the post of Prime Minister of Israel, relatives of the victims of the massacre filed a lawsuit  On 24 September 2003, Belgium's Supreme Court dismissed the war crimes case against Ariel Sharon, since none of the plaintiffs had Belgian nationality at the start of the case.  Reprisal operations According to Robert Fisk, Osama bin Laden cited the Sabra and Shatila massacre as one of the motivations for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, in which al-Qaeda attacked an American Air Force housing complex in Saudi Arabia.  See also War of the Camps 1982 Hama massacre List of massacres in Lebanon Al-Manam Waltz with Bashir References ^ 1982, Robin Moyer, World Press Photo of the Year, World Press Photo of the Year. Archived from the original on 28 July 2012. Retrieved 16 August 2015. ^ a b Schiff, Ze'ev; Ya'ari, Ehud (1985. Israel's Lebanon War. Simon and Schuster. p. 282. ISBN 978-0-671-60216-1. ^ Remembering Sabra & Shatila: The death of their world. Ahram online. 16 September 2012. Retrieved 13 November 2012. ^ International Commission (1983. Israel in Lebanon: Report of the International Commission to Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel during Its Invasion of the Lebanon. Journal of Palestine Studies. 12 (3) 117–133. doi: 10. 2307/2536156. JSTOR 2536156. ^ Sassòli, Marcus; Bouvier, Antoine; Quintin, Anne. "ICRC/Lebanon, Sabra and Chatila. How Does Law Protect in War. International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved 14 October 2018. ^ Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation:Lebanon at War, Oxford University Press 2001 pp. 382–3. ^ William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, University of California Press p. 266 ^ Yossi Alpher, Periphery: Israels Search for Middle East Allies, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015 p. 48 ^ Nathan Gonzalez, The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East, Nortia Media Ltd, 2013 p. 113. ^ Malone, Linda A. (1985. The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the SabraShatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations. Utah Law Review: 373–433. Retrieved 1 January 2013. ^ Hirst, David (2010. Beware of small states: Lebanon, battleground of the Middle East. Nation Books. p. 154. ^ a b c d "A Preventable Massacre. The New York Times. Retrieved 13 November 2012. ^ Hirst, David (2010. p. 157. The carnage began immediately. It was to continue without interruption till Saturday noon. Night brought no respite; the Phalangist liaison officer asked for illumination and the Israelis duly obliged with flares, first from mortars and then from planes. ^ Friedman, Thomas (1995. From Beirut to Jerusalem. Macmillan. p. 161. ISBN 978-0-385-41372-5. From there, small units of Phalangist militiamen, roughly 150 men each, were sent into Sabra and Shatila, which the Israeli army kept illuminated through the night with flares. ^ Cobban, Helena (1984. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: people, power, and politics. Cambridge University Press. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-521-27216-2. and while Israeli troops fired a stream of flares over the Palestinian refugee camps in the Sabra and Shatila districts of West Beirut, the Israeli's Christian Lebanese allies carried out a massacre of innocents there which was to shock the whole world. ^ Menargues 2004, Du coup d'état de Béchir Gémayel aux massacres des camps palestiniens, final chapter. ^ a b Mostyn, Trevor (25 January 2002. Obituary: Elie Hobeika. The Guardian... Retrieved 16 August 2015. ^ Friedman, The New York Times, 20, 21, 26, 27 September 1982. ^ Hassan, Maher (24 January 2010. Politics and war of Elie Hobeika. Egypt Independent. Retrieved 29 December 2012. ^ Bulloch, John (1983) Final Conflict. The War in Lebanon. Century London. ISBN 0-7126-0171-6. p. 231 ^ MacBride, Seán; A. K. Asmal; B. Bercusson; R. A. Falk; G. de la Pradelle; S. Wild (1983. Israel in Lebanon: The Report of International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon. London: Ithaca Press. pp. 191–2. ISBN 978-0-903729-96-3. ^ a b Hirst, David (2010. Beware of small states. p. 153. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8. ^ a b Schiff, Ze'ev; Ya'ari, Ehud (1984. New York: Simon and Schuster. pp. 283–4. ISBN 0-671-47991-1. ^ The New York Times (2012. After 2 Decades, Scars of Lebanon's Civil War Block Path to Dialogue. ^ Israel: A Country Study" Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988 ( online copy) Helen Chapin Metz, ed. (1988. Israel in Lebanon. Israel: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress. Retrieved 24 March 2016. "In July 1981 Israel responded to PLO rocket attacks on northern Israeli settlements by bombing PLO encampments in southern Lebanon. United States envoy Philip Habib eventually negotiated a shaky cease-fire that was monitored by UNIFIL. " Becker 1984, p. 362. ^ Schiff, Ze'ev; Ya'ari, Ehud (1985. pp. 99–100. ISBN 978-0-671-60216-1. ^ Robert Fisk (25 October 2008. Abu Nidal, notorious Palestinian mercenary, was a US spy. The Independent. ^ Cushman, Thomas; Cottee, Simon; Hitchens, Christopher (2008. Christopher Hitchens and His Critics: Terror, Iraq, and the Left. NYU Press. p. 300. ISBN 978-0814716878. ^ a b Hirst, David (2010. p. 134. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8. Clearly, the Israelis had just about dispensed with pretexts altogether. For form's sake, however, they did claim one for the launching of the Fifth Arab—Israeli war. The attempted assassination, on 3 June, of the Israeli ambassador in Britain, Shlomo Argov, was not the doing of the PLO, which promptly denounced it. It was another exploit of Arafat's arch-enemy, the notorious, Baghdad-based, Fatah dissident Abu Nidal. the Israelis ignored such distinctions. ^ Ahron Bergman (2002. Israel's Wars: A History since 1947 (Warfare and History. Routledge. pp. 158–159. ISBN 978-0415424387. Retrieved 24 March 2016. ^ James Gannon (2008. Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination: The History Neocons Neglected (Praeger Security International. Praeger. p. 162. ISBN 978-0313353826. Retrieved 24 March 2016. ^ Becker 1984, p. 257. ^ Israeli, Raphael (1983. PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. p. 7. ISBN 0-297-78259-2. From July 1981 to June 1982, under cover of the ceasefire, the PLO pursued its acts of terror against Israel, resulting in 26 deaths and 264 injured. ^ Morris, Benny (2001. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001. New York: Vintage Books. p. 509. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7. The most immediate problem was the PLO's military infrastructure, which posed a standing threat to the security of northern Israeli settlements. The removal of this threat was to be the battle cry to rouse the Israeli cabinet and public, despite the fact that the PLO took great pains not to violate the agreement of July 1981. Indeed, subsequent Israeli propaganda notwithstanding, the border between July 1981 and June 1982 enjoyed a state of calm unprecedented since 1968. But Sharon and Begin had a broader objective: the destruction of the PLO and its ejection from Lebanon. Once the organization was crushed, they reasoned, Israel would have a far freer hand to determine the fate of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. ^ a b c Hirst, David (2010. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8. ^ a b Nuwayhed al-Hout, Bayan (2004. Sabra and Shatila September 1982. Pluto. p. 1. ISBN 0 7453 2303 0. Retrieved 24 March 2016. ^ Kahan, Yitzhak, Barak, Aharon, Efrat, Yona (1983) The Commission of Inquiry into events at the refugee camps in Beirut 1983 FINAL REPORT (Authorized translation) p. 108 has "This report was signed on 7 February 1982. p. 11 ^ Kahan. pp. 13, 7 ^ By 1982, the Israeli-Maronite relationship was quite the open secret, with Maronite militiamen training in Israel and high-level Maronite and Israeli leaders making regular reciprocal visits to one another's homes and headquarters" Eisenberg and Caplan, 1998, p. 45. ^ Sabra and Shatilla Archived 30 October 2006 at the Wayback Machine, Jewish Voice for Peace. Accessed 17 July 2006. ^ Sabra and Shatila 20 years on. BBC, 14 September 2002. Accessed 17 July 2006. ^ 1982: PLO leader forced from Beirut. BBC. 30 August 1982. Retrieved 23 May 2010. ^ Ahron Bregman and Jihan Al-Tahri. The Fifty Years War. Israel and the Arabs, p. 172-174, London: BBC Books 1998, ISBN 0-14-026827-8 ^ Walid Harb, Snake Eat Snake The Nation, posted 1 July 1999 (19 July 1999 issue. Accessed 9 February 2006. ^ Kahan. 13, 14 ^ a b c d e f g h Shahid, Leila. The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Autumn, 2002) pp. 36–58. ^ Kahan. 15 ^ a b c d Panorama: The Accused" broadcast by the BBC, 17 June 2001; transcript accessed 9 February 2006. ^ Mark Ensalaco, Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012 p. 137. ^ Traboulsi 2007. ^ Kahan. 14 ^ Kahan. 14, 15 ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Kahan ^ Kahan. 13 ^ Linda Malone, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, A War Criminal" Archived 14 July 2006 at the Wayback Machine, Information Brief No. 78, 14 June 2001, The Jerusalem Fund / The Palestine Center. Accessed 24 February 2006. ^ Robert Fisk: The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East, pp. 484, 488–489, ISBN 978-1-4000-7517-1 ^ Becker 1984, pp. 239, 356–357. ^ Becker 1984, p. 264. ^ Daniel Byman (15 June 2011. A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 68. ISBN 978-0-19-983045-9. ^ Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem, Macmillan, 2010 p. 109 ^ Tom Friedman (26 September 1982. THE BEIRUT MASSACRE: THE FOUR DAYS. The New York Times. ^ a b Robert Maroun Hatem, From Israel to Damascus, Chapter 7: The Massacres at Sabra and Shatilla online Archived 12 May 2004 at the Wayback Machine. Accessed 24 February 2006. ^ David Hirst, 2010. 156 ^ The New York Times, 26 September 1982. in Claremont Research p. 76 ^ Kahan. 21, 22 ^ Kahan, Benny Morris 'The Israeli Army Papers That Show What Ariel Sharon Hid From the Cabinet in the First Lebanon War. Haaretz 2 March 2018 ^ Kahan. ^ a b c d Seth Anziska, A Preventable Massacre. The New York Times 16 September 2012. ^ Harbo, 1982. Syrians aid 'Butcher of Beirut' to hide from justice. The Daily Telegraph, 17 June 2001. ^ Dr. Franklin Lamb's letter. Remembering Janet Lee Stevens, martyr for the Palestinian refugees Archived 3 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine ^ ARAFAT DEMANDS 3 NATIONS RETURN PEACE FORCE TO BEIRUT – The New York Times, published 17 September 1982. Retrieved 16 August 2015. ^ Analysis: War crimes' on West Bank. BBC, 17 April 2002. Accessed 14 February 2006. ^ Pluto, 2004 ^ Fisk, Robert The forgotten massacre, The Independent, 15 September 2002. ^ Amnon Kapeliouk, translated and edited by Khalil Jehshan "Sabra & Chatila: Inquiry Into a Massacre. Archived from the original on 7 February 2006. Retrieved 15 July 2005. Microsoft Word doc. Accessed 14 February 2006. ^ Sune Haugbolle, War and Memory in Lebanon, Cambridge University Press, 2010 pp. 144–5 ^ U. General Assembly, Resolution 37/123, adopted between 16 and 20 December 1982. Archived 29 April 2012 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 4 January 2010. (If link doesn't work, try: U. → welcome → documents → General Assembly Resolutions → 1982 → 37/123. ) Voting Summary U. General Assembly Resolution 37/123D. Archived 4 June 2011 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 4 January 2010. ^ Leo Kuper, Theoretical Issues Relating to Genocide: Uses and Abuses" in George J. Andreopoulos, Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, ISBN 0-8122-1616-4, p. 37. ^ a b c d e William Schabas, Genocide in International Law. The Crimes of Crimes, p. 455 ^ a b William Schabas, Genocide in International Law. 454 ^ Professor William A. Schabas Archived 9 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine website of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland ^ William Schabas (2000. Genocide in International Law. University Press, Cambridge. p. 235. ISBN 0521782627. ^ MacBride, Seán; A. ISBN 0-903729-96-2. ^ Hirst, David (2010. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8. ^ Tolworthy, Chris (March 2002. Sabra and Shatila massacres—why do we ignore them. September 11th and Terrorism FAQ. Global Issues. Retrieved 25 January 2013. ^ Israel and the PLO. 20 April 1998. Retrieved 20 September 2007. ^ Hirst, David (2010. p. 168. ISBN 978-0-571-23741-8. ^ Around the world; Israeli General Resigns From Army" The New York Times, 15 August 1983 ^ a b Report of the Kahan Commission – hosted by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs ^ Joel Campagna, The Usual Suspects, World Press Review, April 2002. Accessed 24 February 2006. ^ Menargues 2004, pp. 469–70. ^ Traboulsi 2007, p. 218: On Wednesday 15th, units of the elite Israeli army 'reconnaissance' force, the Sayeret Mat`kal, which had already carried out the assassination of the three PLO leaders in Beirut, entered the camps with a mission to liquidate a selected number of Palestinian cadres. The next day, two units of killers were introduced into the camps, troops from Sa`d Haddad's Army of South Lebanon, attached to the Israeli forces in Beirut, and the LF security units of Elie Hobeika known as the Apaches, led by Marun Mash`alani, Michel Zuwayn and Georges Melko" Dominique Avon; Anaïs-Trissa Khatchadourian; Jane Marie Todd (2012. Hezbollah: A History of the "Party of God. Harvard University Press. p. 22. ISBN 978-0-674-07031-8. That triggered the massacre of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila camps in three waves, according to Alain Menargues, first at the hands of special Israeli units, whose troops reoccupied West Beirut; then by the groups in the SLA; and finally by men from the Jihaz al-Amn, a Lebanese forces special group led by Elie Hobeika. ^ a b c Traboulsi 2007, p. 219. ^ Noam Chomsky (1999. The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians. Pluto Press. p. 377. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0. ^ George P. Shultz (31 August 2010. Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Deal. ISBN 978-1-4516-2311-6. ^ Ariel Sharon, Time archive ^ Sharon Loses Libel Suit; Time Cleared of Malice Archived 3 February 2007 at the Wayback Machine by Brooke W. Kroeger. ^ Vanished victims of Israelis return to accuse Sharon. The Guardian. 25 November 2001. Retrieved 13 November 2012. The fate of the disappeared of Sabra and Chatila will come back to haunt Sharon when a Belgian court hears a suit brought by their relatives alleging his involvement in the massacres. ^ Universal Jurisdiction Update, December 2003 Archived 10 September 2008 at the Wayback Machine, Redress (London. Retrieved 5 January 2010; section Belgium, subsection 'Shabra and Shatila. ^ Penney, J. (2012. Structures of Love, The: Art and Politics beyond the Transference. State University of New York Press. ISBN 9781438439747. Retrieved 16 August 2015. Bibliography Becker, Jillian (1984. PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization. AuthorHouse. ISBN 978-1-4918-4435-9. Bregman, Ahron (2002. Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2 al-Hout, Bayan Nuwayhed (2004. Sabra And Shatila: September 1982. ISBN 0-7453-2302-2. Bulloch, John (1983) Final Conflict. ISBN 0-7126-0171-6 Campagna, Joel (April 2002. The Usual Suspects. World Press Review 49 (4. Web journal article, retrieved 4 December 2004. Chomsky, Noam (1989. Necessary Illusions: Thought control in democratic societies. South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-366-7. Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain and Caplan, Neil (1998. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-21159-X. Hamdan, Amal (16 September 2003. Remembering Sabra and Shatila. Aljazeera. Retrieved 4 December 2004. Harbo, John (20 September 1982. Aftenposten. Middle East correspondent Harbo was also quoted with the same information on ABC News "Close up, Beirut Massacres" broadcast 7 January 1983. Kapeliouk, Amnon (1982. Enquête sur un massacre: Sabra et Chatila. Seuil. ISBN 2-02-006391-3. English translation available online here Klein, A. J. (New York, 2005) Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response, Random House ISBN 1-920769-80-3 Lewis, Bernard. "The New Anti-Semitism" The American Scholar, Volume 75 No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 25–36. The paper is based on a lecture delivered at Brandeis University on 24 March 2004. Lewis, Bernard (1999. Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice. W. Norton & Co. ISBN 0-393-31839-7 Mason, Barnaby (17 April 2002. Analysis: War crimes' on West Bank. BBC World News. Retrieved 4 December 2004. Menargues, Alain (2004. Secrets de la Guerre du Liban. Benny Morris and Ian Black. Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services, Grove, 1991, ISBN 0-8021-1159-9. New 'evidence' in Sharon trial (8 May 2002. Retrieved 4 December 2004. Schiff, Z. Ya'ari, E. (1984. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-47991-1. Shashaa, Esam (no date. Tamal, Ahmad (no date. Sabra and Shatila. All About Palestine. Retrieved 4 December 2004. Tolworthy, Chris (March 2002. Sabra and Shatila massacres – why do we ignore them. Retrieved 4 December 2004. Transcript of "The Accused" 17 June 2001. Traboulsi, Fawwaz (2007. A History of Modern Lebanon. pp. 218–219. United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/37/123(A-F. The situation in the Middle East (16 December 1982. 1] Matthew White, Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century. Retrieved 4 December 2004. William Harris, 1996) Faces of Lebanon. Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton, USA ISBN 1-55876-115-2 External links Lebanese Civil war 1982 Sabra and Chatila massacre Pictures BBC News archive and video "Sabra Shatila Massacre Photographs, 1982. Archived from the original on 9 October 2004. "Eyewitness Lebanon. Archived from the original on 9 October 2004. Report of the Kahan Commission – hosted by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sabra and Shatila: New Revelations, Seth Anziska, NYR Daily (with the Kahan Commission Appendix) Sabra and Shatila by Robert Fisk "Sabra and Chatila Massacres After 19 years, The Truth at Last. By Robert Fisk, The Independent, 28 November 2001 Sabra and Shatila, the unforgivable slaughter (in French) The Kahan Commission on Sabra and Shatila Massacre, published by Israel State Archives.
Children Of Shatila Mai Masri Works with. Watch&Children&of&Shatila&Movie&Online&Free&megashare Children of Shatila hd in hindi, What a Children of Shatila cool Movie? WATCH Children of Shatila FULL MOVIE TAMILYOGI. Diana K. Allan D IANA K. A LLAN is an anthropologist and filmmaker in the Department of Anthropology and International Development Studies at McGill University. She is the creator of the Nakba Archive and Lens on Lebanon, and was a 2013 Guggenheim Fellow in film. Her recent ethnography, Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile [Stanford University Press, 2014] won the 2014 MEMO Palestine academic book award and the 2015 Middle East Section book prize. E-mail: May 15th is the day Palestinians annually commemorate their expulsion by Zionist forces from Palestine in 1948. Hezbollah was one of the few Lebanese political groups to officially endorse the march. The border protests power to inspire new forms of activism was manifest in the rebuilding of the village of Iqrit in August 2012, when a group of third-generation refugees returned to their ancestral village; Leila Zahra-Mortada [ 2012 Zahra-Mortada, Leila 2012 “We are refugees no longer! ”. [Google Scholar. Refugee protests were also held in Egypt, Gaza, Amman, Ramallah, and along the Syrian border with the occupied Golan Heights, as well as other cities across the Arab world. While much of the mobilization of camp communities occurred through independent channels, factions, political parties and NGOs were invited to the planning meetings in an effort to incorporate all institutional players. In an article for Electronic Intifada Matthew Cassel [ 2011c 2011c Refugees march to return. Electronic Intifada, May 31. [Google Scholar] quotes Sharif Bibi, an organizer of the march, making this point: “Palestinians have always dreamed of an Arab revolt since they believe that Palestine wont be liberated until the Arab world is liberated. The fall of Mubarak in Egypt gave hope to people and made the idea … real. ” The fact that activist and mainstream media gravitated to high-profile spokespersons and party representatives raises questions about whose voices have the power or legitimacy to determine how events are framed in the media. In the case of online activist blogs, the occlusion of “ordinary” refugee perspectives may be connected to the unspoken assumption that the urgency of the situation demands a more articulate and media-savvy spokesperson, someone who can artfully mediate the local and the global. Lori Allen writes acutely about the way visual representations of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict tend to stir passionate (rather than intellectual) response, employing communicative strategies that foster, “a sense of immediacy through the joining of emotion and objectivity … through realist, photographic images, as well as through affect-laden narrations and displays of destroyed bodies” [ 2009 Allen, Lori 2009 Martyr Bodies in the Media: Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada. American Ethnologist, 36(1) 161 – 180. [Crossref. Web of Science ] Google Scholar] 172. Amines account also registers this awareness: “Some were taking photos with their own cellphones; others who understood the power of a photo and its impact, and the results it can produce, started to threaten the Israelis of exposing their crimes by downloading images onto Facebook” [2011. For an insightful analysis of the way photographs are re-purposed and circulated through social media to (re)create community, see Nadia Yaqubs [ 2016 Yaqub, Nadia 2016 The Afterlives of Violent Images: Reading Photographs from the Tal al-Zàtar Refugee Camp on Facebook. Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 8(2–3) 307 – 326. [Web of Science ] Google Scholar] study of the Tal al-Za‘tar Facebook groups; also Gregory Starrett [ 2003 Starrett, Gregory 2003 Violence and the Rhetoric of Images. Cultural Anthropology, 18(3) 398 – 428. [Crossref. Web of Science ] Google Scholar. One protester from Naher el-Bared camp, interviewed by Amine, described the importance of capturing Palestine on film: “We wanted to see our country in all its detail, and take photos of it, so we could get our fill of it and be satisfied in some way” [Amine 2011 Amine, Jenan 2011 Durus fi al-Awda [Lessons about Return. July 25, 2011. Jadaliyya; Google Scholar. Yashrutis photo was published in an article by Maureen Murphy [ 2011 Murphy, Maureen 2011 Photostory: Nakba March in South Lebanon. Electronic Intifada, May 30. See Matthew Cassels [ 2011a Cassel, Matthew 2011a Nakba day violence on the Israel-Lebanon border. Al-Jazeera, May 18. [Google Scholar] photo essay for Al-Jazeera. Azoulay writes: “Against the political order of the nation-state, photography—together with other media that created the conditions for globalization—paved the way for a universal citizenship: not a state, but a citizenry, a virtual citizenry, in potential, with the civil contract of photography as its organizing framework” [2008: 134. Many recalled that the last time Palestinians had been allowed to go to the border was in 2000, when their presence helped provide cover for a military operation carried out by Hezbollah in Israel. The 1982 departure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut is viewed by many as an act of betrayal and a watershed moment in the fate of Palestinians in Lebanon. Since the conflict in Syria began in 2011, conditions in all twelve of the countrys Palestinian camps have deteriorated dramatically. Matthew Cassel [ 2011b 2011b Palestinians in Lebanon, at the lonely end of the Arab uprisings. The Guardian, May 16. [Google Scholar] was one of the few journalists to comment on the police presence and the unsettling similarities with the Israeli army. Cassel quotes a protester observing, “Theyre just like the Israelis. Both of them are stopping us from returning home. ” Richter-Devroe and Salih make a related point in their analysis of the way the “global” and the “local” are always imbricated in Palestinian cultures of resistance: “The conditions and contexts for the possibility of perception are set on a global stage. The global spectator is part of the Palestinian stage, and what is legible, sensible, and thus possible ‘here depends also on the ‘there” [2014: 22. In this context, photographs are performative: they are framed within a discourse of humanitarianism and rights and addressed to an international audience. The perceived importance of documenting Israeli violence against Palestinians and creating “visual evidence” for transnational claims-making “hinges on the presumed connections between suffering and political entitlement” [Allen 2009 Allen, Lori 2009 Martyr Bodies in the Media: Human Rights, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Immediation in the Palestinian Intifada. [Crossref. Web of Science ] Google Scholar] 162. Noa Roei, in her analysis of artistic activism in Bilin, describes the dominant representative regime in coverage of the Israel–Palestine conflict: “Palestinians appear in the [Israeli and Western] media regularly, either as a mass of young men who fill the streets in demonstrations and funerals, or as individual women, children or old men, helplessly telling stories of suffering and loss. The first type of image brings home to the viewer the potential of violence; the second bears witness to a victimhood that may bring about a sense of guilt or indifference. Palestinians are thus typically portrayed as either dangerously powerful or utterly powerless, but not as equals to those watching or controlling their actions” [ 2009 Roei, Noa 2009 The Politics of Aesthetics Between Bilin and Tel Aviv. Maarav, July 30. T. J. Demos asks a related question in his analysis of documentary art, which treats the experience of refugees: “How is it possible to represent artistically life severed from representation politically, as when it comes to photographing the stateless …? ” [ 2013 Demos, T. 2013 The Migrant Image: The Art and Politics of Documentary during Global Crisis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. [Crossref] Google Scholar] xv. Demos explores this idea through discussion of the Otolith Groups Nervus Rerum, a film shot in Jenin camp that provocatively refuses the empathetic gaze of conventional documentary and instead opts for “opacity”—a concept that they draw from the literary critic Édouard Glissant, understood as “the empowering capacity of subjects to exist beyond representation” [ ibid. xx. As Gabriel Giorgi observes, “Precarity in its very rhetorical and semantic instability imposes new orderings of the visible, of the sensible, and of the signifiable—a rearrangement of the common … [in ways] that are not yet defined, codified or symbolized” [ 2013 Giorgi, Gabriel 2013 Improper Selves: Cultures of Precarity. Social Text, 115(31) 69 – 81. [Crossref] Google Scholar] 71.
Artboard Copy 2 Created with Sketch. Share Credits Production Mai Masri for Nour Productions Related films Iraq: the road beyond the sunset This unique documentary is a lyrical and beautiful cinematic personal journey told through the eyes of an Arab filmmaker as he and his crew travel through Iraq. The film is a road trip searching for the New Iraq in the faces, towns and hearts of the people. Entering Iraq from the north, he travels through the Kurdish territory introducing us to children in the area which have been affected by Saddam Hussein's rein of power, then to Mosul where they meet a look-a-like 'Saddam' working in a gas station. In Baghdad, the crew meets a local filmmaker trying to recover his film that was destroyed during the bombing of the city. Passing through Najaf, we're introduced to a family paying homage to a lost son. Finally, in Basra, the crew catches a ride with local fishermen and set sail into the Persian Gulf reflecting on people and places theyve discovered during their journey and hope for a brighter future for Iraq. ….
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